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This dissertation examines the “bundle of rights” theory as it meets at the intersection of 
trust and family property law.  Drawing on conceptions of property, the principles and 
purposes of the Property (Relationships) Act and contrasted with trust law, a theory is 
adopted to explain why family property law has presumptive power over trust principles. 
 
Orthodox trust principles are discussed to explain why trust assets are protected from 
third party claims, the importance of the laws of powers and fiduciary obligations, the 
problems created by settlor or appointor control and the reason a “controller” is a 
beneficial owner of trust assets. 
 
The dispositions of relationship property to trusts and the limits on compensatory 
payments are discussed alongside the significance of the abolition of gift duty, other 
statutory remedies and judicial responses.  Case authorities are explored, similarities 
with Australian alter ego trusts are drawn upon, and the application of the “bundle of 
rights” theory is discussed with reference to the valuation of debts and occupation 
orders. 
 
The dissertation concludes that the “bundle of rights” theory draws on an expansive 
meaning of property, it is a principled approach but confined to the Act. 
 
 
Word length  
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 34,475 words. 
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This dissertation discusses aspects of the meaning of property under the Property 
(Relationships) Act 1976 (“PRA”).1  That definition of property includes the phrase 
rights or interests and recently Judges have considered that in certain circumstances a 
spouse, civil union or de facto partner2 may have a property interest in a discretionary 
trust.  This development in the law has become known as the “bundle of rights” doctrine.   
 
This doctrine is highly controversial because orthodox trust principles are based on a 
presumption that a discretionary beneficiary has no more than a mere expectancy of an 
interest in the trust’s assets until the trustees exercise their discretion and make a capital 
or income distribution to that particular beneficiary.  Until that day arrives a discretionary 
beneficiary has no property interest in the assets of the trust. 
 
The possibility that interests in discretionary trusts can be given a property status has 
polarised those who practise in trust and family law.  To some trust lawyers the doctrine 
has been viewed as unprincipled because it disregards the trust relationship and cuts 
across the importance of a trustee’s fiduciary obligations to its beneficiaries.   
 
However, from the family lawyer’s perspective the use of many discretionary trusts is 
seen as a device used to create an illusion of separate ownership of assets as a means of 
sheltering wealth that has accumulated during the relationship and should not be allowed 
to defeat the principles and purposes of the PRA.  An expansive meaning of property 
which includes interests in discretionary trusts is seen as justified in the context of social 
legislation which regulates the rights and obligations of those in qualifying relationships. 
 
This dissertation examines the “bundle of rights” principles and the way in which the law 
in this area is likely to develop without the intervention of Parliament.  As will be seen 
trust and family law has met at a critical intersection and this dissertation considers 
whether there is some theory that can explain the circumstances when the law grants 
property status to some rights and interests at the expense of others, whether the use of 
the modern discretionary trusts are eroding orthodox trust principles, whether the doctrine 
  
1  Property (Relationships) Act 1976, which will be referred to throughout this dissertation as 
the “PRA.”  
2  As the PRA affects those who are married, in a civil union or a de facto relationship, this 
dissertation will refer to those in these three classes either as a spouse and/or a partner or as a 
party. 
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draws upon the alter ego trust principles which have developed in Australian family law 
and whether the “bundle of rights” doctrine is a species of family property and not 
transferable to the general law of property between strangers.  
 
It is in these circumstances that this dissertation examines the current PRA, its structure; 
the way in which it currently responds to the disposition of property into a trust during a 
qualifying relationship and remedies that may be available at the end of the marriage or 
de facto relationship.  No attempt is made to consider possible statutory reforms although 
this dissertation does consider the current mixed and inadequate statutory responses to the 
disposition of relationship property into discretionary trusts.  It is also acknowledged that 
the Law Commission3 is currently reviewing the law of trusts and submissions have been 
called on its second issues paper which considers the use of trusts in both relationship 
property and other contexts. 
 
  
3  Law Commission “Some Issues with the use of trusts in New Zealand: Review of the law of trusts 
second issues paper” (NZLC IP20, 2010). 
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II Property and its Meaning and Power 
A Theory 
 
Property has been powerfully described as “an assertion of self and control of one’s 
environment and provides human beings with a place of deep psychological refuge.  With 
its concreteness and its unfailing assurances, property promises to protect us from change 
and from our fear that we will leave no evidence of our passage through this world.”4  
During our lifetime, property is often the way in which individuals assert their sense of 
self-worth and at times of great emotional distress, when personal relationships 
disintegrate, property provides security and helps to restore a sense of equilibrium in 
times of psychological chaos. 
 
Ownership of property can also be a reflection of financial, emotional and psychological 
power in a relationship.  It comes as no surprise that, at the time of separation, parties to a 
relationship will often exhibit negative feelings, distrust and fear which are heightened in 
situations where the ownership and control of wealth, produced during the relationship, is 
controlled by one party.  An imbalance in power and control has long been recognised as 
inequitable and should not be allowed to defeat the principles of the PRA5 that men and 
women are of equal status and all forms of contribution to their relationship are to be 
treated as equal. 
 
The following is a general discussion of the meaning of property and is not an attempt to 
examine a vast body of literature on property theories or to draw together a conceptual 
understanding of property in the context of family or trust law.  Instead, the focus is on 
the conflict that arises when the law recognises and protects property rights and interests 
for hundreds of years and these legal principles are then challenged by social legislation 
where the meaning of property has been extended to include rights and interests which 
traditionally have not been given the status or property.  The question that then arises is 
whether there is a conceptual theory which can explain when and why some property 
rights and interests will be given priority over others.  
 
  
4  Laura S Underkuffler The idea of property: its meaning and power (Oxford University Press, 
New York, 2003), ch 1 at 1. 
5  Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 1N. 
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What does the word property mean?  The word is simple and arises from the Latin 
proprietas or ownership but on its own the word only conveys a sense that property is 
associated with things that are owned.  For the lawyer, property is sometimes referred to 
as a “bundle of rights” and presents a picture that property is a collection of rights over 
things enforced against others.   
 
William Blackstone6 had an immense influence over the development of concepts of 
property and in his books entitled “Of the Rights of Persons” and “Of the Rights of 
Things” he distinguished between the rights in respect of persons and things and drew a 
distinction which has provided “ … the basis for a general structure of legal concepts.  It 
is within that general structure that myriads of judgments and statutes have been 
written.”7  Yet it is important to acknowledge that Blackstone did not attempt to define 
the scope of property and his commentaries, written nearly 250 years ago, illustrate his 
underlying anxiety and uncertainty as to the boundaries of the meaning of property. 
 
Professor A M Honore, in a classic treatment of the nature of ownership, identified 
eleven elements that he claimed provided the widest conception of property to be found 
within a mature legal system.  He said:8  
 
Ownership comprises the right to possess, the right to use, the right to manage, the 
right to the income of the thing, the right to the capital, the right to security, the 
rights or incidents of transmissibility and absence of term, the duty to prevent harm, 
liability to execution and incident of residuary. 
 
This picture of property, as a conglomeration of rights, provides a broad understanding as 
to what may be included in the definition of ownership but it does not identify any core 
features which must be present if a right is to be given legal status. 
 
This hunt for a definitive understanding of what constitutes property has eluded theorists 
and Underkuffler has described it as “a complex package of normative choices that are 
not fully or adequately explained by any of the conventional understandings of 
property.”9   
  
6  W Blackstone “Commentaries on the Laws of England”  (1765). 
7  Z v Z (No 2) [1997] 2 NZLR 258 (CA) at 278. 
8  A M Honore “Ownership” in Making Law Bind (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987) at 165 and also 
referred to in  Bruce Ziff Principles of Property Law (Thomson Canada Ltd, 4th ed, 2006) Ch 1 
at 2. 
9  Ibid above n 4 at 1. 




In addition the difficult task that property theory has faced is:10  
  
The construction of a workable theory for determining property’s presumptive power 
while acknowledging that the values that property claims assert are socially 
constructed, changeable and often contentious in nature.  There is a tendency in the 
pursuit of property theory either to ignore the socially constructed and volatile nature 
of property, in an attempt to provide predictive power for a proffered theory or to 
acknowledge and then effectively end the enquiry. 
 
Underkuffler argues that traditional theories of property have focused on a theory of 
rights and space.  A theory of rights enables consideration of the rights, privileges, 
powers and immunities of individuals.  However, on its own this dimension does not 
explain the ability of a property owner to engage in activities which either erode or affect 
another property owner’s interest.11 
 
A dimension of space fits easily within a framework of land or other corporeal things but 
where property is of an incorporeal nature descriptions such as ‘scope’ ‘extent’ or ‘limits’ 
are more appropriate descriptions of this dimension.12    
 
In addition, property also needs to be seen through the dimensions of stringency and time.  
Stringency refers to the degree of protection afforded to a right.  A hierarchical ordering 
of rights has been called “one of the essential sticks in the bundle of rights”13 and the 
degree of protection afforded to that right will be indicative of whether, in law, it is 
granted a property status.  Finally, the dimension of time is necessary to determine not 
only when a property right comes into existence but also to assess whether it is fixed or 
variable.14   To put it simply, the devil is in the detail.15 
 
  
10  Ibid above n 4 at 7. 
11  Ibid above n 4 at 20. 
12  Ibid above n 4 at 22. 
13  Ibid above n 4 at 25. 
14  Ibid above n 4 at 29. 
15  Ibid above n 4 at 5. 
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B Conceptions of Property 
 
Conceptions of property are important because they indicate the circumstances when 
competing rights could be given priority over other property rights.  A common 
conception of property involves an assumption that when individual interests are 
recognised as property and protected they are then presumed to be superior to all 
conflicting claims thereafter.  On the other hand an operative conception of property is 
based on the theory that property represents “the outcome of individual/collective 
tensions, determined and redetermined as circumstances warrant.”16 Therefore a 
proponent of a common conception of property places a high value on the prevention of 
arbitrary changes whereas a proponent of the operative conception of property 
acknowledges that property claims involve conflict, fluidity and change.  
 
However, whilst dimensions of property and legal conceptions of property do offer a 
theoretical explanation as to the development of individual rights and interests they do 
not explain the variable power of rights and why some rights are given presumptive 
power over others.  Often, it is assumed that the law recognises the presumptive power of 
rights on a principled basis because the interests that underlie those rights involve values 
that are more important or more worthy than competing rights.17  How the law assesses 
the values that underpin a property right necessarily involves an examination of 
conflicting and changing social attitudes over time.   
 
This normative hypothesis for the power of rights is in keeping with common notions of 
what rights are and why they are recognised in law.  Under this hypothesis, the 
presumptive power of rights adheres only if the values that the right involves are not 
shared.  Consequently, if the claimed rights have been recognised in law then they will 
continue to have presumptive power because the core values are different in kind.   
 
Whereas, in situations where the core values between competing rights are the same in 
kind, then they are viewed as presenting competing interpretations about the nature of 
foundational rights that they both rely upon.  In those circumstances “the conflict 
between them is a struggle that is internal to that right, over that right’s definition, scope 
and meaning.  The claimed right and the competing public interest are of presumptively 
equal power”.18 
  
16  Ibid above n 4 at 62. 
17  Ibid above n 4 at 74. 
18  Ibid above n 4 at 75. 




I will consider the opposing and shared core values that give substance to the meaning of 
‘rights or interests’ under the PRA together with the meaning of rights or interests 
afforded to beneficiaries of a discretionary trust and the rights of trustees to manage and 
appoint property to themselves as a discretionary beneficiary. 
 
Underkuffler provides a model which predicts when claimed rights should have 
‘trumping power’ over other rights.19  In particular, traditionally claimed rights will have 
presumptive power over competing interests when the core values under the claimed right 
are different to the competing interests.   
 
However, where the claimed rights and competing public interests share the same core 
values they are viewed as competing for the same foundational right and the “conflict 
between them is a struggle that is internal to that right’s definition, scope and meaning”20 
and in those circumstances each competing right and interest are of presumptively equal 
power.  For instance, a publisher of pornography may seek to justify publication on the 
basis of a right to free speech, whereas those that oppose publication do so on the basis 
that it has the effect of silencing those who are degraded by it.  In these circumstances 
both sides are relying on different aspects of the core values of freedom of speech such as 
“the promotion of personal autonomy and the need for a vibrant and varied public 
discourse.”21 
 
This model also recognises that property rights are not necessarily constant and 
unchanging.  The meaning and extent of property rights are always subject to the “wider 
context”22 which is driven by what society decides are core values which should be 
protected over others.  Consequently, a right or interest which required the protection of 
the law a hundred years ago may have a weaker foundational claim to that protection in 
the modern context.  
 
  
19  Ibid above n 4 at 74. 
20  Ibid above n 4 at 75. 
21  Ibid above n 4 at 78. 
22   Z v Z (No.2) above n 7 at 279. 
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C Core Values in Trust and Family Law 
 
In order to apply this model it is necessary to consider the protection afforded by equity 
to the power to appoint assets of a discretionary trust as well as administer the trust with 
the core values that underpin the definition of property under the PRA.  This is not to 
suggest that all discretionary trusts share the same core values with the principles and 
purposes of the PRA.  However, there are an increasing number of discretionary trust 
deeds where the power to control the trust is centralised and given to a spouse or partner 
and it is the writer’s view that these types of discretionary trusts share three shared core 
values with the principles and purposes of the Act, namely the control, protection and 
preservation of property for those in qualifying relationships.   
 
To expand on this proposition it is necessary to consider the function of the discretionary 
trust, its characteristics and codes of regulation.  The express trust has been described as 
“equity’s imposition of stringent personal obligations upon a legal owner to hold property 
for the benefit of another, with the result that a trustee cannot treat the property as their 
own.”23  The discretionary trust is one form of an express trust and it enables the trustee 
to select who is to get what benefit from the trust’s income and assets and generally has 
no obligation to distribute all of the trust’s income and assets, at any time, leading up to 
the date of final distribution.  This structure is inherently flexible, can meet changes in 
circumstances and needs of beneficiaries as well as protect the trust’s assets from third 
party claims. 
  
The growth in popularity of the modern discretionary trusts is also a product of a risk-
adverse society which seeks protection from the arms of the unsecured creditor, the 
Official Assignee, endeavours to obtain state funded benefits such as residential home 
care subsidies as well as minimise tax liabilities.  Not infrequently, the discretionary trust 
structure is seen as a means of side stepping the statutory safeguards provided by the 
PRA to those in a qualifying relationship.   
 
The ability to control the trust fund is found in the unfettered discretions granted to 
trustees to make payments to beneficiaries.  Fiduciary obligations play a central part of 
the law of equity24 and it is the means by which equity regulates the exercise of power by 
trustees and thereby protects the beneficiary from a trustee using their powers for 
  
23  J E Penner The Law of Trusts (6th ed, Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2008) at 1.16. 
24  Andrew Butler (ed) Equity and Trusts in New Zealand (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 
2009) at [17.1] [Equity and Trusts]. 
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improper purposes and also to ensure that the trustee acts in good faith and in the best 
interests of the beneficiaries.25  The public policy which underlies fiduciary law rests on a 
foundation of promotion and preservation of a trusting relationship.  The strict application 
of fiduciary obligations is seen as providing effective protection.26  In this way the law 
protects the rights of trustees to exercise their discretions without interference provided 
they act in a bona fide way.   
 
The policies and principles of the PRA are also deeply embedded in the preservation and 
protection of property rights for those in qualifying relationships.  The Act is neither a 
technical statute nor a part of the law of property in any traditional sense.  The Act 
represents the culmination of a gradual process of statutory reform which leaves the 
property of the persons within its jurisdiction to be dealt with by a set of rules very 
different from those which govern the property of strangers in common law.27  It is social 
legislation of the widest general application.28 
 
Historically, in New Zealand, the common law approach to marital property was to vest 
title, control and ownership in the husband.  This approach to domestic property was 
referred to as the unitary system.  However, the Matrimonial Property Act 1976, created a 
deferred community property approach whereby property acquired during the marriage 
belonged to the community of both spouses but the rules of property ownership did not 
apply until the marriage ended either in separation or death. This system of deferred 
community property was extended to de facto relationships29 and those in civil unions30 
and it spells out a strong bias in favour of equal entitlement of spouses and de facto 
partners to property created by their efforts during the relationship.31 
  
The purpose of the Act32 recognises the equal contributions made by qualifying spouses 
or partners to a relationship, that when that relationship ends there is to be a ‘just’ 
  
25  At [17.2.2(1)]. 
26  At [17.2.9]. 
27  Family Law in New Zealand (looseleaf, ed, LexisNexis) at 7.301 [Family Law in NZ]. 
28  At [7.302] also referring to Reid v Reid [1979] 1 NZLR 572, 580, 605 and 610 per Woodhouse and 
Richardson JJ. 
29  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 2D, defines a de facto relationship and the Act came into force 
on 1st February 2002. 
30  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 2B defines a civil union – came into force following the 2005 
Amendment Act. 
31  Family Law in NZ above n 27 at [7.302]. 
32  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 1M. 
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division of property in accordance with the rules contained in the Act.  The principles 
which are intended to guide the achievement of the purpose are that the equal status of 
men and women should be maintained and enhanced, that all forms of contribution are to 
be treated equally, a just division has to take into account the economic advantages and 
disadvantages of the period of cohabitation and finally that questions “should be resolved 
as inexpensively, simply, and speedily as is consistent with justice.” 33   
 
The recognition of equal contributions to the relationship also illustrates that a qualifying 
relationship is to be regarded as a partnership and “… not as a unity nor as a legal 
relationship between two strangers” and that the contributions of each party during the 
relationship are presumed to be of equal worth.34  Further, the division of property is not 
about taking away from one party to give to the other because the principle of partnership 
recognises that each has an entitlement to share in their partnership assets.  In this way 
common law concepts of property ownership have been subsumed under a framework of 
statutory rules aimed at protecting property interests for those in qualifying relationships 
to ensure that each should share equally in the material wealth generated by their 
partnership.   
 
The gradual reform of family property law has been one steeped in notions of justice and 
common sense which have overcome legal formalism.  By way of example, 
characteristics of ‘debts’ under the PRA may be subject to different interpretations to 
those in common law because:35 
 
That broad objective suggests that as far as possible there should be a general 
balancing of the benefits and burdens in the partnership ledger without fine regards 
to the technicalities which words such as ‘debt’ might attract in other contexts. 
 
The PRA also provides a code of protection of property entitlements through its 
definition of relationship property,36 conversion (in certain circumstances) of separate 
property to relationship property,37 an ability to grant compensation38 together with the 
  
33  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 1N. 
34  Family Law in NZ above n 27 at [7.302]. 
35  Robert Fisher QC (ed) “Fisher on Matrimonial and Relationship Property”  (on line looseleaf ed) 
Characteristics of ‘Debt’ and ‘Owing’ at [15.6]. 
36  Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 8. 
37  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 9 and s 9A. 
38  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 15, 18A-C, s 44C. 
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safeguards imposed on parties who wish to contract out of the PRA.39  In this way the 
PRA recognises the breadth of property entitlements as well as providing rules to ensure 
those rights are not unilaterally usurped.   
 
Assuming that some discretionary trusts and family property law share the same core 
values then it is still necessary to consider whether case authorities favour a common or 
operative conception of property.  In Z v Z (No 2) the Court of Appeal considered that the 
definition of property meant that:40 
 
The consistent, cumulative use of that definition and its use in this particular case 
strongly indicate that the conventional understanding of ‘property’ is being drawn on 
in this statute.  That proposition is of course subject to the point that the concept of 
‘property’ is fluid and has extended over the years to include interests which might 
not earlier have been covered by it.  Its meaning and scope must also be affected by 
the statutory and wider context in which it is used. … The wider context includes 
changing social values, economic interests and technological developments … 
 
In that case the Court had been asked to consider whether the husband’s enhanced 
earning capacity could be a property interest.  The Court of Appeal declined to expand 
the definition of property to include a spouse’s future earnings.  Nevertheless, it 
recognised that the husband’s interest in his legal partnership was property despite the 
partners’ agreement that their interest in the goodwill of the firm had a ‘nil value’41 and 
that interest could not be sold or transferred to a third party. The property interest was the 
‘bundle of rights’ derived from the partnership which included the client base “which 
assists a partner to generate income”42 in excess of an individual partner’s output and a 
consequential right to share in these super profits, a retirement benefit as well as an 
expectation of continued membership until the date of retirement.   
 
A common conception of property would focus on the retirement benefit as the property 
in question.  Yet the Court adopted an operative conception by granting property status to 
the ‘bundle of rights’ arising out of the husband’s membership of the law partnership. 
 
  
39  Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 21 and s 21A. 
40  Z v Z (No.2) above n 7 at 279. 
41  At 289. 
42  At 290. 
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It is the writer’s view that despite the Court’s reference to ‘conventional’43 
understandings of the meaning of property, Z v Z (No.2)44 illustrates that the PRA draws 
on operative concepts of property and consequently conflicting property rights and 
interests will involve fluidity and change.  That is not to suggest that the courts have a 
general mandate to extend the meaning of property beyond that which Parliament has 
been willing to legislate but rather it recognises that in certain circumstances the courts 
have and will continue to expand the meaning of property to interests which traditionally 
did not have a property status.  This is a result of a continual process of examination and 
evaluation of core values which justify the classification of those interests into either 
property or non-property status.  
 
Consequently, within the boundaries and framework of the PRA, this dissertation will 
argue that an expansive meaning of property can include interests in some discretionary 
trusts particularly where a spouse or partner can control the administration and 
disposition of trust assets.  An expansive meaning of property gives some interests in 
discretionary trusts a property status which is not recognised at common law.  In these 
circumstances the family property rights are given ‘trumping ’power over orthodox trust 
principles.    
 
Before considering whether an expansive meaning of property can extend to interests in 
discretionary trusts it is necessary to consider the trust orthodoxy and the reasons that the 
law protects trust assets from third party claims.  
 
  
43  At 279. 
44  Ibid above n 7. 
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III The Trust Orthodoxy 
 
This chapter considers the way in which discretionary trusts operate in practice, the 
powers vested in trustees and their fiduciary obligations which regulate the trust 
relationship. It needs to be acknowledged that there are many differences within 
discretionary trusts and it is not intended to suggest that the matters raised in this chapter 
are comprehensive and applicable to all discretionary trusts.  
 
However, the purpose of this discussion is to consider equity’s response to the types of 
discretionary trust where trust powers are centralised and given to an individual who is a 
trustee and beneficiary and may also hold the power to ‘hire and fire’ other trustees.  The 
essential question is whether orthodox principles are realistic and applicable to situations 
where wealth generated during a relationship is held in a trust fund.  
 
A Features of Discretionary Trusts 
 
As discussed in chapter 2 the structure of discretionary trusts are varied but they are 
inherently flexible, can meet changes in circumstances and needs of its beneficiaries.  
To understand the dilemma between trust and family property law it is necessary to 
consider the features of discretionary trusts which culminate in the orthodox view that 
trust assets cannot fall within the definition of property under the PRA.  
 
The starting point is that a discretionary beneficiary has no proprietary interest in the 
trust’s assets but only a mere expectancy or hope that one day the trustees may in their 
absolute discretion decide to make a distribution to that beneficiary.45  Until that decision 
has been made a discretionary beneficiary has a limited property right to the due 
administration of the trust, can hold trustees accountable for acting irrationally, 
capriciously or improperly, prevent trustees from breaching their fiduciary obligations 
and can trace misappropriated trust assets.46  Nevertheless these rights do not create a 
property interest in the trust fund. 
 
In contrast, under a fixed trust the beneficiaries are the equitable owners of the trust 
property and can deal with their interest, for instance by offering it as security for other 
  
45  Gartside v Inland Revenue Commissioners  [1968] AC 553. 
46  Nicola Peart “Relationship Property and Trusts” (paper presented to NZLS Intensive Relationship 
Property – your big (legal) day out. August 2010 at 5–10 [“Relationship Property and Trusts”]). 
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borrowings.  The beneficiaries effectively own the entire equitable interest and if they are 
of full age and agree they can compel the transfer of the legal interest to themselves.47  
 
Generally, the trustee’s discretion to distribute assets is referred to as a ‘bare power’ 
which means it is a personal power – “which can be exercised only by the person or 
persons to whom it is given”48 and cannot be assigned.  Further it is a ‘bare power’ 
because the trustee is not under any obligation to periodically consider whether to 
exercise the power.   
 
A power to distribute capital and/or income amongst a class of beneficiaries49 may be – “ 
… ‘general’ in that the donee is allowed to exercise it in favour of anyone he chooses, 
‘special’ in that it can only be exercised in favour of specified persons, or purposes .. or 
‘hybrid’ in that it is exercisable in favour of anyone except for specified persons of 
purposes.”50   
 
There is a significant difference between a general and a special power which Tipping J 
in the recent Supreme Court judgment of Kain v Hutton explained in this way:51 
 
A general power of appointment entitles the donee/appointor to appoint to anyone at 
all, including himself.  There cannot therefore be excessive execution of, or a fraud 
on, such a power because it is logically impossible for the donee/appointor to exceed 
the donor’s mandate.  By contrast a special power enables the donee/appointor to 
appoint only to those specifically permitted by the donor’s mandate.  A special 
power is one where the objects of the power are limited by the terms upon which 
power is granted.  An appointment to a person who is not a permitted object will 
usually represent an excessive execution of the power. 
 
The modern discretionary trust deed tends to favour ‘special’ powers of appointment but 
concerns have grown that when a beneficiary effectively ‘controls’ the trustees then the 
power appears to be closer to a general power.  However, before commenting further on 
the issue of ‘control’ it is necessary to consider the conceptual distinction between a 
  
47  Saunders v Vautier (1841) Cr & Ph 240; 41 ER 482. 
48  Geraint Thomas “Thomas on Powers” (1st ed, Sweet & Maxwell Limited, London, 1998) 
at [1-48]. 
49  At [1.55]. 
50  At [1.55]. 
51  Kain v Hutton [2008] 3 NZLR 589 (SC), at [47] Tipping J. 
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‘power’ and ‘property’ and it is useful to repeat the often quoted passage from in Re 
Armstrong, when Fry LJ stated:52  
 
The question is whether the general power of appointment given to the bankrupt is 
her “separate property” within the meaning of sub-s 5 of s 1 of the Act of 1882.  To 
my mind the question is one of the most elementary description, and if it had not 
been argued as it has, I should have thought it unarguable.   No two ideas can well be 
more distinct the one from the other than those of “property” and “power”.  This is a 
“power” and nothing but a “power”.  A “power” is an individual personal capacity of 
the donee of the power to do something.  That it may result in property becoming 
vested in him is immaterial; the general nature of the power does not make it 
property.  The power of a person to appoint an estate to himself is, in my judgment, 
no more his “property” than the power to write a book or sing a song.  The exercise 
of any one of those three powers may result in property, but in no sense which the 
law recognises are they “property” of the person in whom they are vested, because 
every special capacity of a person may be said to be his property: but they are not 
“property” within the meaning of that word as used in law.  Not only in law but in 
equity the distinction between “power” and “property” is perfectly familiar, and I am 
almost ashamed to deal with such an elementary proposition. 
 
The court’s justification for the conceptual separation between ‘powers’ and ‘property’ 
has been explained by Congreve in the following way:53 
 
The consistent refusal of the Courts to characterise powers of appointment as 
proprietary interests reflects the view that powers are merely a form of contingent 
event.  If a proprietary interest is defined as a right in or relating to property, a power 
or capacity to alter legal relations with respect to property might be regarded as 
carrying a property interest.  However, the Courts have always regarded the donee of 
a power of appointment as merely a conduit for the conveyance of the donor.  A 
donee of a power has no more than the capacity to act, to appoint or not to appoint, 
and the effect of the appointment derives from the instrument creating the power. 
 
Whilst 115 years ago the distinction between a power and property was one of  “most 
elementary description” it may not be so clear with the modern discretionary trust when 
dispositive powers are increasingly centralised and given to trustees who are also 
  
52  Re Armstrong (1886) 17 QBD 521 at 531-532. 
53  Anthony Grant “Cradle to the Grave: the Interface between Property and Family Law” at 14 
quoting from Dr R L Congreve “The Nature and Extent of Trustees’ powers of appointment, 
selection and disposition” (PhD Doctorial Thesis) at 2-07. 
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beneficiaries.  The ability by trustee/beneficiaries to benefit themselves makes it difficult 
to rationalise the proposition that a power is a form of contingent event when the 
distinction between legal and equitable interests is blurred.  
  
A more compelling reason that powers cannot be equated with property rights rests on the 
platform that a trustee’s discretions and beneficiaries’ interests in the ‘due administration’ 
of the trust are protected by the shield of the laws of powers and fiduciary obligations 
which equity has evolved for the purpose of supervising the activities of those who are 
entrusted to act in the interests of others.54    
 
The law of fiduciary obligations has been described as a “central part of the law of 
equity”55 because the fiduciary is expected to act in the interests of the beneficiary and 
the law discourages behaviours which are inconsistent with the nature of the relationship 
between trustee and beneficiary. 
 
This code of regulation occurs at two levels: firstly at the decision making stage where 
there is a duty not to delegate discretions, not to act under another’s dictation; not to place 
fetters on discretions and to consider whether a discretion should be exercised.  The 
second level refers to the exercise of powers where the court considers whether the 
trustee intends to defeat or depart from the intention of the settlor and these duties 
include: to exercise powers for relevant consideration and for the purposes for which they 
were given; not to act for the fiduciary’s own benefit, or the benefit of a third person, to 
treat beneficiaries equally if they have similar rights, to treat beneficiaries fairly if they 
have dissimilar rights and not to act capriciously or totally unreasonably.56   
 
If there are breaches of fiduciary duties then the trustee may have acted in ‘excess’ of the 
exercise of a power (although much depends on the scope of the specific power)57 and if 
the trustee acts deliberately by breaching the implied obligation not to exercise that power 




54  John Glover “A challenge to established law on discretionary trust? Re Richstar Enterprises” 
(2007) 30 Aust Bar Rev 70 at 3 and 10. 
55  Equity and Trusts in New Zealand  above n 24 at [17.1]. 
56  Thomas on Powers, above n 48 at Ch 6(1) p 261 to 333. 
57  At [8-02]. 
58  At [9-01 – 9-02]. 
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Despite its centrality, fiduciary law is a difficult area because there is great uncertainty as 
to the core underlying principles and the obligations imposed on fiduciaries. It has been 
said that fiduciary law is “a concept in search of a principle”.59   
 
Consequently, when there are concerns that a discretionary beneficiary may be in a 
position to ‘control’ or ‘influence’ trustees’ decisions then how does equity respond?  
What are the circumstances surrounding the decision-making process and what is meant 
by the unanimity rule?  When can a trustee obtain a benefit from the trust fund?  Can a 
trustee also be a beneficiary?  In what circumstances can the holder of a power of 
appointment ‘hire and fire’ trustees? 
 
B Fraud on a Power 
 
Fraud on a power is based on the concept that a trustee cannot exercise a power for an 
improper purpose.  In such situations wrongful appointments are voidable.  The law 
against fraud on a power applies to both dispositive and administrative powers as well as 
the exercise of a discretion.  There has been controversy over whether a power can be 
exercised to benefit a non-object of the trust. 
 
In Wong v Burt60 and Hammond J summarised the law as follows:61 
 
The particular expression, ‘a fraud on a power’ rests on the fundamental juristic 
principle that any form of authority may only be exercised for the purposes 
conferred, and in accordance with its terms.  This principle is one of general 
application. 
 
And in relation to the central question as to what makes the exercise of a discretion or 
power ‘improper’:62 
 
… The central principle is that if the power is exercised with the intention of 
benefiting some non-object of the discretionary power, whether that person is the 
person exercising it, or anybody else for that matter, the exercise is void.  If on the 
  
59  Equity and Trusts above n 24 at [17.1]. 
60  Wong v Burt [2005] 1 NZLR 91 (CA). 
61  At [28] Hammond J. 
62  At [30] Hammond J. 
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other hand, there is no such improper intention, even although the exercise does in 
fact benefit a non-object, it is valid. 
 
Therefore as Kenny concludes the test for a fraud on a power “revolves around the power 
holder’s purpose or intention in exercising the power.  It must align with the proper 
purpose of the power; and a fraudulent exercise of a power is totally invalid unless the 
improper part can be severed.”63 
 
Another gray area arises when the power holder’s purpose is a mixture of both proper and 
improper purposes. This was the situation in the case of Kain v Hutton64 when the 
trustees exercised the power of appointment in favour of a beneficiary but on the 
understanding that the beneficiary would immediately resettle the assets on a new trust 
for the benefit of herself but also her spouse and children who were not beneficiaries of 
the original trust. 
 
The Supreme Court found that the trustees had not committed a fraud on the power 
because the trustee’s ‘dominant purpose’65 was to benefit an object of the trust and it did 
not matter if the power holder had another purpose of benefitting non-beneficiaries as 
well. 
 
Many modern discretionary trust deeds incorporate wide powers to bring forward the date 
of distribution of the trust fund and/or resettle the assets of a trust onto a further trust 
where the beneficiaries may be different.  Following a separation a spouse or partner may 
want to wind up a trust and/or resettle the assets on a class of beneficiaries which do not 
include the other spouse or partner.  Whilst there may be other available remedies for the 
prejudiced party66, the test for fraud on a power, illustrates the difficulty that a party faces 
in relying on the trustees’ fiduciary obligations to challenge a disposition of property to a 
  
63  Equity and Trusts above n 24, Jeff Kenny “Requirements for valid exercise of a Trustee’s power” 
at [6.5(4)]. 
64  Kain v Hutton [2008] 3 NZLR 589 (SC). 
65  Equity and Trusts above n 24 and 63 at [6.5]  the author queries whether the majority of judges in 
Kain v Hutton were referring to ‘actuating purpose’ in line with earlier authorities when they 
concluded the trustees had not committed a fraud because the trustees ‘dominant purpose’ was to 
benefit an object of the trust. 
66  See Chapter 6 for remedies under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 44C and Family 
Proceedings Act 1980 s 182 but only for prejudiced spouses or those in civil unions in certain 
circumstances. 
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new trust for the benefit of one party to the qualifying relationships together with 
different beneficiaries.   
 
C Unanimity  
 
The unanimity rule is expressed in Garrow and Kelly Law of Trusts and Trustees67 as 
follows: 
 
All trustees must concur in the exercise of powers conferred on them with reference 
to the trust estate.  Unless the trust document says otherwise, the act of the majority 
of the trustees cannot bind a dissenting minority or the trust estate.  The dissenting 
minority may of course defer to the judgment of the majority as long as they act in 
good faith. 
 
In Rodney Aero Club Inc v Moore Hammond J observed68 that the unanimity rule is a 
corollary of the non-delegation principle so that if trustees cannot delegate, it follows that 
they must all perform the duties attendant upon execution of the trust. 
 
As a dissenting trustee can defer to the judgment of the majority this can be problematic 
in a situation where a settlor can ‘influence’ or persuade another trustee to follow his or 
her views.  In many family trust arrangements the trustees are likely to be appointed from 
a group of individuals who are known to the settlor and family dynamics are likely to 
play a significant role in influencing outcomes. A lack of unanimity may become difficult 
to prove. 
 
Another significant issue with the unanimity rule is the degree of participation required 
by all trustees particularly when important decisions have to be made regarding the 
distribution of trust capital and/or income.  Dever v Knobloch69 illustrates the difficulties 
that can arise when a trustee consents by acquiescence and therefore participates in the 
decision making process but in a limited way.  Dobson J took the view that:70 
 
…formal endorsement of the documents following the decision being made by other 
trustees is not sufficient to meet what is a requirement for substantive participation 
  
67  Noel Kelly(ed) Law of Trusts and Trustees (6th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2005) at [19.3.8]. 
68  Rodney Aero Club Inc v Moore [1998] 2 NZLR 192 at 195. 
69  Dever v Knobloch HC, Napier, 29 October 2009, CIV-2008-441-000537, Dobson J. 
70  At [34]. 
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by all trustees in what was a fundamentally important decision to distribute the 
Trust. 
 
Whilst this decision reinforces the importance of actual participation during the decision 
making process it still leaves open the issue of ‘influence’ and deference to the wishes of 
other trustee(s).  Further as many small family trusts are poorly administered the trail of 
records may be few and in many cases non-existent.  In summary, equity’s response to 
the rule of unanimity offers a discretionary beneficiary the opportunity to challenge the 
decision making process but it will only apply to historical decisions and cannot be used 
to predict a possible lack of unanimity. 
  
D Conflicts of Interest and Self-Dealing 
 
Subject to the terms of the trust deed, a trustee cannot earn unauthorised remuneration 
and/or obtain a financial benefit from their position as a trustee.  This rule of equity is 
“part of a wider rule that a trustee must not place him or herself in a position where the 
trustee’s duty and interest may conflict”.71 
 
As Butler notes:72 
  
Not all cases of personal interest however are straightforward.  Some will involve 
fine judgment calls, and will depend on whether there is a preference for the 
prophylactic approach or a conscience-based approach.  In Jones v AMP Perpetual 
Trustee Co NZ Ltd … Thomas J held the view that: “Whether there has been a 
breach of this underlying principle will, to a large extent be a question of fact and 
degree.  His Honour favoured Lord Upjohn’s dissenting view in Boardman v Phipps 
that there must be objectively “a real sensible possibility of conflict” … 
 
The self-dealing rule applies to conduct of trustees only in their capacity as a trustee and 
prevents trustees from profiting from their position as legal owners of the trust assets.  
Therefore “if a trustee sells trust property to himself or herself, the sale is voidable by any 
beneficiary however fair the transaction”.73  
 
  
71  Law of Trusts and Trustees above n 67 at 4.13] referring to Boardman v Phipps [1966] 3 All ER 
721, 756-757, Lord Upjohn. 
72  Equity and Trusts above n 24 at [17.3.1(2)]. 
73  Law of Trusts and Trustees above n 67 at [4.13]. 
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However, the self-dealing rule does not apply to decisions on distributions to 
beneficiaries of trust assets.  Further a trustee who is also a beneficiary can benefit from 
the trust74 because the Privy Council has made it clear that a person can be both a trustee 
and beneficiary.75  Consequently a trustee “who is also a beneficiary can exercise his or 
her discretion as a trustee to benefit him or herself, and equity does not intervene in such 
cases”.76 
 
This then raises the question as to whether a trustee’s decision to benefit himself or 
herself as a beneficiary can be held to be unreasonable.  As Dobson J held in Dever v 
Knobloch:77 
 
… On the approach in Craddock v Crowhen78, the test to establish unreasonableness 
against trustees is a high one, namely whether the decision was one that no 
reasonable trustees, properly advised, could possibly have come to.  
 
As can be seen equity’s response to claims of conflicts of interest and self-dealing are 
limited and do not apply in all circumstances where a trustee is also a discretionary 
beneficiary. 
 
E Power to Add and Remove Beneficiaries  
 
Most modern discretionary trust deeds include a power to add or remove beneficiaries.  In 
the context of a separation this is a powerful tool and can be used to remove the former 
spouse or partner and later add a new spouse or partner and his or her children. This can 
be particularly unfair when the trust fund is largely derived from relationship property of 
the first qualifying relationship. 
 
Whilst trustees owe fiduciary duties when exercising their power to add or remove 
beneficiaries they are “not required to exercise this power impartially as between classes 
  
74  Law of Trusts and Trustees above n 67 at [4.14.1]. 
75  Commissioner for Stamp Duties of the State of New South Wales v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd 
[1943] AC 425 referred to Law of Trusts and Trustees above no 67 at [4.14.1]. 
76  Sargeant v National Westminster Bank (1990) 61 P&CR 518. referred to in Law of Trusts and 
Trustees above n 67 at [4.14.1] 
77  Dever v Knobloch above n 69 at [64]. 
78  Craddock v Corwhen (1995) 1 NZSC 40,331. 
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of beneficiaries, nor do they have to act in the best interests of all the beneficiaries.”79  If 
the facts support a breach of fiduciary obligations then the court can intervene if the 
trustees have acted improperly80 or capriciously.  Capricious conduct has been defined as 
“acting for reasons that could be said to be irrational, perverse or irrelevant to any 
sensible expectation of the settlor.”81 
 
If a settlor reserves this power and is not a trustee then there is no fiduciary obligation 
and the settlor can remove or add the beneficiary without giving reasons. 
 
Again, whilst it may be possible for a former spouse or de facto partner to challenge the 
trustees’ decision to add or remove beneficiaries the evidential threshold is high and 
depends upon who holds the power to add and remove beneficiaries.  
 
F Power of Appointment: The Power to Hire and Fire Trustees 
 
Most discretionary trust deeds provide for a nominated power holder to have the authority 
to remove and replace trustees, that person may ultimately have the ability to ‘control’ the 
decision making of the trustees by being able to appoint sympathetic trustees and remove 
those who are unwilling to support a power holder’s views on the exercise of both 
administrative and dispositive powers.   
 
The power to appoint and remove trustees is a limited power under a trust deed but must 
be exercised honestly and without ulterior motives.  In the classic text of Farwell on 
Powers82 the author puts the principle this way: 
 
A person having a limited power must exercise it bona fide for the end designed; 
otherwise the execution is corrupt and void. 
 
  
79  Hills v Public Trust HC Auckland CIV-2008-404-2217, 15 March 2010 at [152].referred to in 
“Relationship Property and Trusts” above n 46 at p 6 
80  Wong v Burt above n 60 for the meaning of ‘improper’. 
81  “Relationship Property and Trusts” above n 46 at p 5. 
82  George Farwell Farwell on Powers 3 ed (Stevens & Sons Ltd, London, 1916) at p 457. 
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In many modern discretionary trust deeds it is not uncommon for the settlor to be the 
power holder and may not need to give reasons for the removal and replacement of 
trustees.  The orthodox view is that a donee of such a power cannot appoint him or 
herself as a trustee.  In Re Skeats’ Settlement Kay J held that a donee’s decision to 
appoint himself was invalid because the power was fiduciary in character:83 
 
The universal rule is that a man should not be judge in his own cause: that he should 
not decide that he is the best possible person, and say that he ought to be the trustee 
… to appoint himself among other people, or excluding them to appoint himself 
would certainly be an improper exercise of any power of selection of a fiduciary 
character such as this is.  In my opinion it would be extremely improper for a person 
who has a power to appoint or select new trustees to appoint or select himself. 
 
Yet, many discretionary trust deeds permit the power holder to appoint themselves as 
trustees and the Trustee Act 1956 provides “that express powers of appointment 
contained in the trust instrument take precedence over the statutory powers contained in 
the Act”.84  
 
This issue is of particular interest in family law because the power holder’s ability to 
exercise this power to ‘hire and fire’ trustees and appoint him or herself as a trustee has 
led some judges and commentators to suggest that it is likely the donee will use this 
power to their advantage.  Consequently the proposition in Re Skeats Settlement that 
equity would hold such an appointment as invalid has not been accepted.  
 
Certainly this is the position in Australia, In the Marriage of Goodwin85 the Family Court 
of Australia approved an earlier decision of In the Marriage of Reynolds when the Court 
said:86 
 
We do not find the decisions in Re Skeats Settlement (supra) and Re Crawshay 
(Dec’d) (supra) of any real assistance.  These cases were dealing with trusts and 
powers of appointment of a completely different nature and were decided in 
circumstances which bear no resemblance to the present proceedings.  In particular 
the power of appointment in the present case is not a fiduciary power but a power 
  
83  Re Skeats’ Settlement (1889) 42 Ch D 522 at 524. 
84  Law of Trusts above n 23 at [4.37] referring to Trustee Act 1956, s 2 and s 43(1). 
85  In the Marriage of Goodwin (1990) 101 FLR 386. 
86  In the Marriage of Reynolds (unreported, Family Court, Full Court, 27 April 1990) at p 391. 
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which by the terms of the deed the husband may exercise for the purposes of 
controlling the trust for his own benefit if he so chooses. 
 
Another family property case where the Courts were not convinced that the rule in Re: 
Skeats still applied is the United Kingdom Court of Appeal judgment of Charman v 
Charman.87  This case concerned a non-resident trust.  The wife claimed that the husband 
had an interest in that trust fund which should be considered his ‘financial resource’88 and 
that interest should form part of the pool of matrimonial property.  The husband had a 
power of removal of trustees and the argument for the wife was that he could use that 
power to replace a trustee who declined his request for a distribution from the trust fund.   
 
The husband relied on the rule in Re: Skeats’ Settlement and argued that his ability to 
remove trustees was a fiduciary power and he could not lawfully remove a trustee 
because he refused to accede to his request.  The husband’s argument was raised on the 
first day of the appeal and the Court held:89 
 
There is no need for us to decide this peripheral issue.  It has arisen very late and has 
not been fully argued on either side.  We consider that exploration of the difficult 
interface between the likely exercise of powers in the real world and what must for 
the court be the dominant requirements of the law is better left to another occasion. 
 
Apart from Australia (which is discussed in Chapter 4), the interface between what is 
likely to happen and equity’s response to breaches of fiduciary obligations has not been 
fully argued. 
 
Critics who reject the concept that a power holder can ‘control’ the trust focus on two 
principal reasons: firstly, wrongful appointments can be restrained by the court and 
secondly, a power to dismiss trustees does not entail control of the trustees’ decision 
making until the power has been exercised.  In other words likely conduct is not a ground 
for supporting a suspicion that the power holder will exercise ‘control’ by misusing the 
power to ‘hire and fire’ trustees.   
 
This is one of the fundamental dilemmas between the approach taken in family law where 
social realism is the benchmark and Family Courts are used to making predictive 
  
87  Charman v Charman [2007] 2 FCR 217 (CA) Sir Mark Potter P. 
88  Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s 25(2)(a). 
89  Ibid n 87 at [55(f)] (the writer’s emphasis). 
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judgments regarding future events (particularly in the area of income maintenance, 
economic disparity claims and in some valuation exercises).  There is no such approach 
in equity where “equity follows the law” and until a breach of fiduciary obligations can 
be established, on the balance of probabilities, what may or may not happen in the future 
is largely irrelevant. 
 
It is useful at this point to pause and consider the circumstances when the courts can 
appoint new trustees “either under the inherent jurisdiction derived from its general 
supervisory jurisdiction over trusts or under the specific provisions of s 51 Trustee Act 
1956”.90 
 
In Mendelssohn v Centrepoint Community Growth Trust91 Tipping J “held that the 
Court’s task in appointing a trustee under s 51 is to appoint the person or persons best 
suited to administer the trust in the circumstances prevailing.”92  The Court of Appeal 
were guided by the principles described in Re: Tempest93 and “have regard to the settlor’s 
intentions; neutrality between beneficiaries and promotion of the purposes of the trust.”  
With regards to the settlor’s intentions Tipping J stated:94 
 
If … it can be seen that either expressly or implicitly the author intended the trustees 
to be of a certain description, the Court will give considerable weight to that 
expression of the author’s wishes.  But … the Court is not bound by those wishes 
and is entitled to depart from them if good cause is shown.  Here it was.  The second 
point is that trustees must be neutral and even-handed as between beneficiaries with 
different interests. 
 
Whilst the High Court does have the ability to supervise the exercise of the donee’s 
power to ‘hire and fire’ trustees it does not mean that in that process the court will review 
appointments based on a suspicion of likely abuse of  fiduciary obligations.   
 
G Conclusion 
As can be seen equity’s response to wide dispositive powers in the hands of a 
trustee/beneficiary is a mixed bag.  On the one hand strict adherence to fiduciary 
  
90  Equity and Trusts above n 24 at [5.2.3(4)]. 
91  Mendelssohn v Centrepoint Community Growth Trust [1999] 2 NZLR 88 (CA). 
92  Law of Trusts above n 23 at [4.37.1]. 
93  Re Tempest (1866) LR 1 Ch App 485. 
94  Law of Trusts above n 23 at [4.37.1]. 
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obligations is a means of ensuring that trustees do not exploit their position of trust but 
case authorities are not straightforward, impose tests with difficult thresholds and require 
a fine balancing of facts on a case by case basis.  In family situations there is a strong 
likelihood that the enforcement of fiduciary obligations will slip below the radar as both 
legal cost and judicial uncertainty make adherence to obligations difficult to enforce. 
 
Consequently, there in an uncomfortable relationship between the principles and purposes 
of the PRA and the equitable principles which protect trustees’ powers and obligations.  
For reasons that will emerge in the next chapter, in Australia, the judiciary have been 
largely unimpressed with justifications to protect discretionary trusts from spousal claims 
by relying on the laws of powers and fiduciary obligations. 
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IV Australia – The Meaning of Property and the Discretionary Trust 
A Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the meaning of ‘property’ within the Australian Family Law Act 
1975 (“FLA”).  The reason that Australian case law is of particular interest arises out of  
the recent High Court of Australia’s decision in Kennon v Spry95 which has opened the 
door to not only a wide interpretation of the meaning of property but has also peeled back 
the protections afforded to discretionary trust assets in family law claims.   
 
It has been suggested that it is inappropriate to rely on the Australian definition of 
property as a guide to interpret the meaning of ‘property’ and ‘owner’ under the Property 
(Relationships) Act 1976.96   Whilst it is accepted that there are many differences 
between the property sharing schemes in each country, there is one common theme: 
jurisdiction in both statutes is only invoked when there is property to be distributed 
between the parties.   
 
In both countries the definition of property is broadly stated and is silent on whether 
interests in discretionary trusts are or can be given property status.   In the absence of any 
legislative guidance judges have wrestled with orthodox trust law principles in the 
context of family law legislation.  In both countries similar questions have been asked:  
Does a spouse who has ‘control’ of a discretionary trust have a property interest in the 
assets of the trust?  Can discretionary interests be proprietary interests?  Should orthodox 
principles prevail and have presumptive power over the claims of those in qualifying 
relationships?    
 
For the reasons set out in this chapter, Australian judges have preferred to expand the 
meaning of property at the expense of conventional trust principles.  The way that 
property interests in trusts has developed in Australia is instructive for two reasons: firstly 
the recent New Zealand development of the concept of a ‘bundle of rights’ in family trust 
cases has an uncanny resemblance to the Australian concept of the alter ego trust.  
Secondly, the development of the alter ego trust illustrates Underkuffler’s proposition 
  
95  Kennon v Spry (2008) 251 ALR 257 (HCA). 
96  Equity and Trusts above n 24 Ch 41, Nicola Peart “Equity and the Property (Relationships) Act 
1976” at [41.2.2] [“Equity and the PRA”]. 
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that property rights evolve as a consequence of conflicting and changing social attitudes 
over time.97 
 
Before commencing this discussion it is important to reflect on the features of the PRA98 
which differ from the FLA.99   The most significant difference lies in the scheme of 
property entitlements.  For the reasons explained in chapter 2 the PRA is a deferred 
property sharing scheme.100  During the period of cohabitation the parties are free to deal 
with their property101 but upon separation, death or an application to the Family Court the 
property of the parties is classified into relationship102 or separate property103 and then 
divided on the assumption that there should be an equal division104 of all relationship 
property.  Timing issues are significant not only because they affect the property 
available for division but also the date of valuation of those assets.105   
 
In Australia, the starting point for matrimonial property law is the “ordinary rules of law 
and equity relating to real and personal property” despite the intervention of the FLA.106  
However, the FLA revised the ordinary rules in respect to the property of the parties in 
two significant ways: firstly, it brings all property disputes between spouses within the 
jurisdiction of the Family Court and secondly, it enables the court to “alter the property 
interests” of the parties at any time during their joint lives.107  
 
The FLA gives courts wide discretionary powers to alter the parties’ property interests to 
achieve a result that is just and equitable.  Although the discretion is wide it “is not at 
  
97  See chapter 2 above n 17. 
98  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (“the PRA”). 
99  Family Law Act 1975 (“FLA”) This statutory regime is confined to parties to a marriage whereas 
the Property (Relationships) Act extends to de facto relationships as well as parties to a civil 
union. 
100  Robert Fisher QC “Fisher on Matrimonial and Relationship Property” (online looseleaf ed, 
LexisNexis) at [1.2] [Fisher on Relationship Property]. 
101  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 19(a). 
102  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 8. 
103  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 9 -10. 
104  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 11. 
105  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 2F. 
106  Anthony Dickey Family Law  (The Law Book Company Ltd, Sydney, 1985) at Ch 20 Introduction 
to Matrimonial Property at [2(1)] on p 474. 
107  At [2(1)] at p 492. 
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large: s 79(4) sets out the factors to be taken into account in property distribution”108 
which include past financial and non-financial contributions together with future means 
and needs.  Consequently, the FLA does not classify assets nor does it presume that there 
is to be an equal division of the value of assets between the parties.  Timing and valuation 
issues remain relevant but do not assume the same importance as under the PRA. 
 
In terms of procedural matters, the PRA provides safeguards against the disposition of 
property to third parties by enabling a spouse or a partner to register a claim against the 
title to land under the Land Transfer Act.109  The Family Court can also restrain the 
disposition of assets to a third party, if its purpose is to defeat the rights or claims of a 
spouse or partner110 and can set aside a disposition if it has been made “in order to defeat 
the claim or rights of any party”111 otherwise in good faith and/or for valuable or 
adequate consideration.   Whilst the Family Court does have the power to make ancillary 
orders “varying the terms of a trust or settlement,”112 and provide compensation for 
relationship property disposed of into a trust113 these provisions have provided only 
limited relief for a dispossessed party for the reasons discussed in chapter 6. 
 
By contrast the FLA enables a court to grant an injunction in proceedings “in relation to 
the property of a party to the marriage”114 and again this provision has been given a wide 
interpretation.  Essentially, there are two requirements for an injunction; that there is an 
existing or potential claim to an order altering property interests and a danger that the 
claim may be defeated or prejudiced unless such an injunction is granted.115  The court 
can also grant an injunction against a third party.116  There is also power to restrain and 
set aside dispositions which may defeat an existing or anticipated order in the 
proceedings “irrespective of intention.”117  The court can also make an order altering the 
property interests of the party which is binding on a third party provided the third party 
  
108  HA Finlay, RJ Bailey-Harris, MFA Otlowski Family Law in Australia (5th ed, Butterworths, 
Australia, 1997) Ch 6 Property Division at [6.26]. 
109  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 42. 
110  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 43. 
111  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 44. 
112  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 33(1)(m). 
113  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 44C. 
114  Family Law Act 1975 s 114(1)(e). 
115  Richard Chisholm (ed)  Australian Family Law (loose leafed, LexisNexis Butterworths Australia) 
at [114.24]. 
116  Family Law Act 1975, s 90AA. 
117  Family Law Act 1975 s 106B. 
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has been accorded ‘procedural fairness’ and the court is satisfied that the order is ‘just 
and equitable.’118  Finally, there is power to appoint a person to “do all acts and things 
necessary to give validity and operation to the deed or instrument.”119  In summary the 
FLA provides a more robust structure to claw back third party assets into the property 
pool, provide injunctive relief as well as make orders that are binding upon third parties. 
 
B The Meaning of ‘Property’ in Australia 
 
The starting point is to consider the statutory definition of the word ‘property’ under the 
FLA. 
 
Property is defined in s 4(1)(a) as:120  
 
(a)  property to which those parties are, or that party is, as the case may be, 
entitled whether in possession or reversion 
 
Section 79 provides:121 
 
(1) In property settlement proceedings, the court may make such orders as it 
considers appropriate: 
 
(a) in the case of proceedings with respect to the property of the parties to 
the marriage or either of them – altering the interests of the parties to 
the marriage in the property; … 
 
Section 79 then requires the court to take a four step approach to:122   
 
(a) assess the extent of the property of the parties and determine its value; 
 
(b) consider what contributions have been made by the parties, including direct 
and indirect contributions of a financial character and non-financial character, 
  
118  Family Law Act 1975 s 90AE. 
119  Family Law Act 1975 s 106A. 
120  Family Law Act 1975 s 4(1)(a). 
121  Family Law Act 1975 s 79(1)(a). 
122  Australian Family Law above n 115 “General Principles in Exercising Discretion under s 79: Four 
step approach” at [79.151]. 
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and contributions to the welfare of the family, including contributions as 
home-maker and parent; 
 
(c) consider the circumstances which relate to the present and future needs of the 
parties and to their means, resources and earning capacity, actual and 
potential; 
 
(d) consider the effect of the above findings and resolve what order is just and 
equitable in all the circumstances of the particular case.  
 
Section 79 distinguishes between three sources of wealth; being income, property and 
financial resources and each may be considered in deciding the manner in which the 
property of parties should be divided but the Court can only make orders in respect of the 
property of one or both spouses.123   
 
The courts have a broad discretion to reallocate property as a result of two factors:124 
 
(1)  the jurisdiction extends to all of the property of the husband and wife, 
whenever acquired; and (2) there is an absence of legislative guidance 
regarding how s 79 should be interpreted and applied …  
 
The Court’s ability to consider all property of either spouse has raised important 
questions regarding the boundaries of the marriage partnership, particularly the extent to 
which the duration of the marriage is relevant and the property over which the marriage 
partnership extends.  Consequently, judges are often divided over whether to take a 
partnership or individualistic approach to the pool of property available for division.  A 
partnership approach is more likely to result in all the parties’ property being available 
for division whereas the individualistic approach focuses on the link between the 
marriage and particular assets in question.125 
 
  
123  Stephen Parker, Patrick Parkinson, Juliet Behrens Australian Family Law in Context (The Law 
Book Company Limited, Australia, 1994) at p 597. [“Australian Family Law in Context”]. 
124  Belinda Fehlberg & Juliet Behrens Australian Family Law: The Contemporary Context (Oxford 
University Press Victoria, Australia, 2008) [The Contemporary Context”] at p 468 and quoting 
from Patrick Parkinson “Quantifying the Homemaker Contribution in Family Property Law” 
(2003) 31 Federal Law Review 1, 5. 
125  At p 468. 
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Further as s 79 gives the Courts a broad discretion which allows for outcomes to reflect 
the facts of each case but is also affected by individual judicial values.  These tendencies 
have been enhanced by the High Court of Australia’s insistence that the Court’s 
discretion should not be fettered by formulaic approaches.  As one commentator has 
noted:126 
 
… [t]he effect of this is that the discretion of trial judges, broad enough by the terms 
of the legislation is effectively even broader because of the Full Court’s inability to 
create firm rules control the exercise of that discretion 
 
This legislative and judicial background is also reflected in the expansive way that the 
courts have applied the definition of property to the assets of the parties. The meaning of 
property has been given a very broad construction under the FLA.  The starting point is 
illustrated in one of the earliest FLA cases In the Marriage of Duff127 when the Full Court 
supported the definition of ‘property’ found in an old English case of Jones v Skinner128 
that “Property is the most comprehensive of all terms which can be used inasmuch as it is 
indicative and descriptive of every possible interest which the party can have”.   
 
This broad definition of ‘property’ extends to real and personal, corporeal and incorporeal 
property and the words “whether in possession or reversion” have been interpreted as 
words of extension and not limitation.129  Yet, as Justin Gleeson SC130 commented the 
terminology of ‘possession or reversion’ “… invokes notions of strict property law” 
found in statutes from the nineteenth century such as the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 
(UK)  rather than looser and broader conceptions which have developed in Australia.”   
 
Whilst the definition of property does not extend to mere personal rights131 (such as the 
right to occupy the family home) nor a mere hope or expectation of acquiring an interest 
  
126  At p 468, quoting from Richard Ingleby “Introduction: Lampert and Lampposts: The End of 
Equality in Anglo-Australian Matrimonial Property Law?” (2005) 19 International Journal of Law, 
Policy and the Family 137 at 146. 
127  In the Marriage of Duff [1977] FLC 90-217, 76-133. 
128  Jones v Skinner (1835) 5 LJ Ch 90. 
129  Australian Family Law above n 115 at [79.69]. 
130  Justin Gleeson SC “Spry’s case: Exploring the limits of discretionary trusts” (2010) 84 ALJ 177 
at 184 [“Spry’s case”]. 
131  Mullane v Mullane (1983) 45 ALR 291. 
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or receiving a benefit such as a discretionary payment under a trust, it can include future 
contingent interests.132    
 
As the statutory definition of property refers to ‘entitlement’ the Courts have considered 
whether or not property has to be alienable.  In the Marriage of Best the Full Court 
considered a case where the husband was a partner in a large law firm.  The couple had 
few assets so the husband’s interest in his legal practice took on special significance.  The 
Court held that the husband’s interest was property despite the fact that the Partnership 
Deed contained limitations on the ability of partners to assign their interests133.  The 
Court held that:134  
 
[i]nalienability does not deprive an interest of the characteristic of property except 
where it is an inherent characteristic of the right that it is both personal and 
unassignable and hence not proprietary in character, the most common example of 
which is a personal right to sue for damages. 
 
The court went on to explain135 that disincentives or practical difficulties associated with 
alienation did not prevent the interest from constituting property.  Nevertheless the 
practical difficulty is that the court could not assign the husband’s interest in his law 
practice and therefore the husband retained his partnership interest, was ordered to pay 
substantial spousal maintenance (together with his child support obligations) and the wife 
retained the balance of property.   
 
As commentators have noted136, the outcome of this case made it unnecessary for the 
Court to decide if the partnership interest was property.  For all practical purposes the 
interest could have been treated as a ‘financial resource’ of the husband but for reasons 
that are explored further in this chapter it will be seen that there is a significant advantage 




132  Australian Family Law above n 115 at [79.69]. 
133  The Contemporary Context above n 124 at p 471. 
134  In the Marriage of Best (1993) 16 Fam LR 937 at 952. 
135  At 954. 
136  The Contemporary Context above n 124 at p 471. 
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In the recent High Court of Australia decision of Kennon v Spry137 Gummow and 
Hayne JJ considered standard forms of statutory interpretation within FLA and also cases 
where a ‘right’ may not ordinarily be considered as ‘property’ and they held:138 
 
The phrase … ‘with respect to the property of the parties to the marriage or either of 
them’ should be read in a fashion which advances rather than constrains the subject, 
scope and purpose of the legislation.  In particular, as statements by this court 
illustrate the term ‘property’ is not a term of art with one specific and precise 
meaning.  It is always necessary to pay close attention to any statutory context in 
which the term is used.  In particular it is, of course, necessary to have regard to the 
subject-matter, scope and purpose of the relevant statute. 
 
The questions that arise in these matters raise a dispute about the construction of the 
Act.  That dispute is not resolved by considering only the ways in which the term 
property may be used in relation to trusts of the kinds described as ‘discretionary 
trusts’.  As Binnie J, writing for the Supreme Court of Canada, has recently said 
(albeit in a different statutory context):139 
 
[16] … The task is to interpret [the relevant statutes] in a purposeful way 
having regard “to their entire context, in their grammatical and ordinary sense 
harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the 
intention of Parliament. 
 
And … because an interest (in that case, a fishing quota): 
 
[16] … may not qualify as ‘property’ for the general purposes of the common law 
does not mean that it is also excluded from the reach of the statutes.  For particular 
purposes Parliament can and does create its own lexicon. 
 
To summarise, the current position in Australia is that the definition of ‘property’ is 
interpreted in a purposeful way having regard to the FLA and the factual context of each 
case. If an interest does not gain a property status at common law or in another statutory 
setting that does not mean that it does not qualify as property under the FLA.   
 
  
137  Kennon v Spry (2008) 251 ALR 257 (“Spry”). 
138  At [89-90] per Gummow and Hayne JJ. 
139  Saulnier v Royal Bank of Canada 2008 SCC 58 at [16]. 
39 Relationship Property and Trusts: The “Bundle of Rights” Theory  
 
 
C ‘Property’ or ‘Financial Resource’? 
 
For the reasons already touched on there is an important distinction between the 
definition of property and a financial resource under the FLA.  The term financial 
resource is not defined in the FLA but case authority has developed definitions which 
include: 140 
 
a financial stock or reserve over which a party has sufficient control as a matter of 
fact to draw upon when necessary towards supplying some financial want or 




The term “financial resource” must add something not covered by the term “income 
and property”.  For example, a contingent interest or benefits which a party actually 
receives or is likely to receive, whether legally entitled thereto or not … 
 
The Court has no jurisdiction to make orders redistributing a party’s financial resources.  
Section 4(1) requires that only property to which a spouse ‘is entitled’ can be the subject 
of an order.  This involves establishing that a spouse has legal control over the asset in 
question.142 
 
There is considerable significance between defining an asset as ‘property’ as opposed to a 
spouse’s interest in a ‘financial resource’.  As the authors of Australia Family Law143 
note the benefit of treating an asset as ‘property’ is that the non-owner’s contribution to 
that asset will be considered at the second step in the division of assets.  At this stage the 
Court considers the parties’ contributions (both financial and non-financial) and where 
the Court’s adopt the ‘partnership approach’ the financial award for a non-owning spouse 
is likely to be significant.  However, when the Court considers a ‘financial resource’ at 
the third step (often referred to as the ‘offsetting’ stage) of the reallocation of property 
interests and historically those awards are less generous.   
 
  
140  Australian Family Law above n 115 at [75.9] also referring to In the Marriage of Kelly (No 2) 
(1981) 7 Fam LR 762. 
141  At [75.9]. 
142  The Contemporary Context above n 124 at p 472. 
143  At p 470-471. 
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A finding that a spouse’s interest is a ‘financial resource’ may be of little benefit to a non-
owner spouse if the property pool available for division is small or non-existent because 
there may be insufficient property to offset a ‘financial resource’ award.  This distinction 
between property and a financial resource is similar to the position in New Zealand when 
the Family Court is asked to make a compensatory payment for the disposition of 
relationship property to a discretionary trust.144 The Court can be met with a similar 
difficulty if there is little or no property (either relationship or separate property) to pay 
compensation. 
 
As will be seen, in the context of discretionary trusts, these practical implications have 
been influential in expanding the category of interests that are given property status and 
some of the earlier ‘financial resource’ case authorities have become redundant. 
 
D Control and the Alter Ego Trust 
 
In Australia, like New Zealand, the use of discretionary trusts is widespread and as 
Peter Nygh and Andrea Cotter-Moroz observe145 the usual purpose of the modern 
discretionary trust is to create the illusion of separate ownership but nevertheless to retain 
real control over the disposition of trust assets even though it is the essence of a trust that 
the person who holds the office of trustee or appointor does not have any right of 
property in the assets of the trust.   
 
The characteristics of control and illusion of separate ownership has been highly 
influential in the development of the meaning of property under the FLA.  In the case of 
Ascot Investments Pty Ltd v Harper146 the Full Court had to consider the type of orders 
which could be made against a company in circumstances where the evidence established 
that husband controlled the company. Gibbs J held:147 
 
The position is, I think, different if the alleged rights, powers or privileges of the 
third party are only a sham and have been brought into being, in appearance rather 
than reality, as a device to assist one party to evade his or her obligations under the 
Act.  Sham transactions may always be disregarded.  Similarly, if a company is 
  
144  Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 44C. 
145  Peter Nygh and Andrea Cotter-Moroz “The Law of Trusts in the Family Court” (1992) 
6 Australian Journal of Family Law 4, 6 – 7 [“The Law of Trusts in the Family Court”]. 
146  Ascot Investments Pty Ltd v Harper (1981) 148 CLR 337; 33 ALR 631 (“Ascot”). 
147  At p 644 per Gibbs J. 
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completely controlled by one party to a marriage so that in reality an order against 
the company is an order against the party, the fact that in form the order appears to 
affect the rights of the company may not necessarily invalidate it. 
 
Following Ascot the concepts of third party interests being ‘mere puppets’ or the alter 
ego of the controlling spouse were more fully developed in the case of In the Marriage of 
Ashton148 where the husband was the appointor and he appointed another trustee 
company in which he and his cousin were sole directors and shareholders (the cousin 
holding his share on trust for the husband).  Whilst, the husband was not a beneficiary of 
the trust he handled the trust assets as if they were his own, dealing with trust property 
and income as he liked and for his benefit.  Unsurprisingly, the court concluded that the 
trust was no more than the husband’s alter ego and went on to say “the powers which the 
husband had in the Ashton family trust settlement gave him control of the trust either as a 
trustee or through a trustee which is his creature.”149 In those circumstances the husband 
had both de facto legal and beneficial ownership of the trust’s assets. 
 
Ashton’s case was factually uncontroversial because the husband admitted treating the 
trust assets as if they were his own property.  However, later cases raised more complex 
issues including:  whether a trustee/spouse ability to make a self distribution of trust 
assets means that this is likely to happen;  whether spouse/appointor’s ability to appoint a 
compliant trustee is conclusive of finding that the appointor has ‘control’ of the 
discretionary trust;  whether a trustee’s ability to ‘influence’ another or other trustees is 
‘control’ and finally whether a spouse who is a beneficiary, trustee and holds a power of 
appointment has de facto ownership of trust property. 
 
Slowly, Australian case authority moved to a position where the courts were primarily 
concerned with the trust deed and what it enabled a spouse to do rather than what may or 
may not have happened during the marriage.  This shift in judicial thinking increasingly 
opened the door for the courts to scrutinize discretionary trust structures in family 
property proceedings. 
 
In the Marriage of Davidson150 the husband was appointor and also had controlling 
interests in a company which was the trustee of the MAVK Trust.  Like Ashton the Judge 
described the trust as ‘the creature of the husband’.  Whilst the husband conceded that he 
  
148  In the Marriage of Ashton (1986) 11 Fam LR 457 (“Ashton’s case”). 
149  At p 462. 
150  In the Marriage of Davidson [No.2] (1990) 101 FLR 373 (“Davidson”). 
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could divert income and assets of the trust for his own purposes it was argued that such 
manipulation of the trust would amount to a breach of fiduciary duty.  However the Court 
found:151 
 
Whatever may have been the position one hundred years ago; Australian courts 
today have to look at the reality of the situation and the purpose which family trusts 
serve today.  A limitation as to the husband’s power to control the assets and income 
of the trust in accordance with the provisions of the trust deed is inconsistent with 
the reasoning of the Full Court in Ashton … 
 
In all these cases counsel made strenuous submissions that the Court was not at liberty to 
depart from trust principles that protected trust assets from third party claims. However, 
in the context of the FLA, the Courts showed little deference to orthodox trust and 
equitable principles. As Nygh and Cotter-Moxon observe152 “[i]t is these trust devices, 
rather than any decision of the Full Court which has departed from the traditional law of 
trusts” and they then go on to explain:153 
 
As long as the object of the trust, upon proper construction of the trust deed and in 
light of the factual circumstances of the case, is advanced and not defeated by the 
orders of the court, such orders cannot be said to ignore the traditional law of trusts.  
Therefore where the object of the trust, as appearing from the trust deed, is to put a 
party into a position of complete and unfettered control just as if they were the owner 
of the trust property, an order of the Family Court effecting this reality is a result 
permitted by the trust deed itself.  Therefore, such an order is not inconsistent with 
the traditional law of trusts. 
 
This analysis is not without its critics because as many trust lawyers point out a 
discretionary trust presupposes that it is left to the trustee to decide how the relevant 
income or capital will be distributed and concepts such as unfettered control ignore the 
trust relationship.   
 
Another major criticism is that the distinction between  ‘property’ and a  ‘power’ has 
been blurred to the point that the dictum in Re Armstrong154 has been overruled and the 
power of a person to appoint “an estate to himself” is deemed to be a property interest.  
  
151  At p382. 
152  “The Law of Trusts in the Family Court” above n 145 at p 16. 
153  At p 18. 
154  Re Armstrong (1886) 17 QBD 521 and see the discussions in chapter 2. 




Despite these criticisms, these decisions do not mean that the trust structure is irrelevant 
or to be treated as a sham in family law but they do show that notions of justice and 
common sense will prevail over the legal formalism inherent in earlier decisions155. The 
courts will not permit a party to shelter assets behind a legal framework or allow one 
spouse to gain a financial advantage out of wealth that has accumulated during the course 
of that marriage. 
 
Until 2007, there was little direct judicial consideration of the rule in Gartside156 (that a 
discretionary interest cannot be a proprietary interest) and where it sat in relation to a 
growing body of case authority built around the concept of spousal control of a 
discretionary trust.   However, in Re  Richstar Enterprises Pty Ltd: ASIC v Carey 
(No 6)157 (a tax case)  the Federal Court observed that in the ordinary case the rule in 
Gartside applies but French J then said:158 
 
I distinguish the ‘ordinary case’ from the case in which the beneficiary effectively 
controls the trustee’s power of selection … there is something which is akin to a 
proprietary interest in the beneficiary. 
 
A proprietary inference can be drawn from effective control of a discretionary trust as 
follows:159 
 
the beneficiary who effectively controls the trustee’s power of selection because he 
is the trustee or one of them and/or has power to appoint a new trustee has something 
approaching a general power and the ownership of the trust property. 
 
Since Richstar, judges in other Australian jurisdictions have not universally accepted that 
orthodox principles of trust law can be discarded on the grounds of ‘control’.  The 
counter-view is explained in a recent Supreme Court of New South Wales case where 
White J in Public Trustee v Smith160 considered the proposition that control of a trust 
gave a discretionary beneficiary a beneficial interest in the assets of the trust.  He rejected 
  
155  “The Law of Trusts in the Family Court” above n 145 at 21. 
156  Gartside v IRC [1968] AC 533. 
157  Re Richstar Enterprises Pty Ltd: ASIC v Carey (No 6) (2006) 153 FCR 509 (“Richstar”). 
158  At [29]. 
159  At [37]. 
160  Public Trustee v Smith [2008] NSWSC 397. 
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that proposition on the basis that this “would mean that she was the beneficial owner of 
the trust property prior to causing the trustee to appoint the property to herself”.161 
 
E Kennon v Spry162   
 
If there was any doubt that control of trustees could create a beneficial interest then it was 
settled by the High Court of Australia in Spry’s case. The facts in Spry need to be fully 
explained in order to understand how the expansion of the meaning of property has 
eroded orthodox trust principles.  Dr Spry settled a trust by parol in 1968.  He prepared a 
trust instrument but did not execute it because of stamp duty.  He married in 1978.   The 
trust deed was signed and stamped in 1981.  Dr Spry was settlor, trustee and a 
beneficiary.  He had power to appoint and remove any other person as an additional 
trustee.  He also had a power to vary the terms of trust provided that the variation did not 
increase his rights to the beneficial enjoyment of the trust fund.  The beneficiaries 
included his wife and subsequently born children. He could apply any part of the income 
and capital to any of the beneficiaries.  At the date of distribution the fund was to be 
divided amongst such beneficiaries as the trustee felt fit and in default equally amongst 
all male beneficiaries.  Dr Spry as trustee had a power to invest or deal in the fund as if it 
was his own absolute property.  In effect he had complete control of the trust.  
 
In 1983 Dr Spry appointed his wife to be the trustee on his death or resignation, provided 
the appointment was revocable by him at any time. Dr Spry then abandoned all beneficial 
interests or rights which he might have as settlor and confirmed that by removing himself 
as a beneficiary.   
 
When the marriage was in trouble in 1998, he revoked the appointment of his wife as the 
successor to him as trustee and instead appointed his two eldest daughters jointly.  The 
terms of the trust were varied so that both Dr Spry and his wife were irrevocably 
excluded from receiving any part of the capital of the trust.  This was unnecessary for Dr 
Spry if the 1983 Deed remained effective.  Dr Spry’s explanation in Court was that he 
had forgotten about the 1983 Deed.   
 
In October 2001 the parties separated.  In January 2002 Dr Spry established 4 separate 
trusts for each of his daughters by applying both capital and income from the original 
  
161  At [108] per White J (my emphasis). 
162  Kennon v Spry (2008) 251 ALR 257 (“Spry’s case”). 
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trust.  He was the trustee of each of his children’s trusts.  The beneficiaries included the 
daughter as primary beneficiary plus the daughter’s children, grandchildren, sisters, 
nephews, nieces and their spouses.  Dr Spry had a power to apply all or any part of the 
income or capital for the benefit of any of the beneficiaries.  Dr Spry was excluded 
absolutely from any interest in the fund.163 The marriage was dissolved prior to the 
substantive property hearing. 
 
In the Family Court the wife filed for property orders under s 79 and the trial judge 
included the assets of the daughters’ trusts as part of the property pool.  In order to 
include the trusts’ assets the 1998 and 2002 instruments had to be set aside and once that 
had occurred there were two pathways to the approach that the trusts’ assets were to be 
included as part of the marital property pool.  Either, Dr Spry could reverse the 1983 deed 
and thereby reinstate himself as a beneficiary and then be able to distribute the whole of 
the assets of the trust to himself.   Or, as Dr Spry had sufficient control over the assets of 
the trust and their distribution the assets should be regarded as his.  The second approach 
was adopted by the trial judge who relied on earlier case authority described in this paper.  
 
On appeal the Full Family Court by a majority agreed with the first approach, namely that 
it was open to Dr Spry to rescind the 1983 instrument and thereby reinstate himself as a 
beneficiary and if necessary with the consent of the wife.  The majority did not approve 
the second approach because although Dr Spry had control over the assets of the trust 
through his ability to appoint/remove trustees he did not have an ability to benefit from 
distributions of income or capital and in those circumstances the Court was not prepared 
to accept that he had sufficient ‘control’.  Finn J, dissenting, took the orthodox approach 
and would have allowed the appeal in Dr Spry’s favour. 
 
Then Dr Spry appealed to the High Court on the basis that Finn J’s dissent judgment in 
the Full Court was correct as it was not open to Dr Spry to reinstate, whether by 
agreement with the wife or otherwise, his position as a beneficiary.  The assets of the 
trust post 1983 could never be considered to be his property. 
  
The High Court concluded that whilst the 1983 deed remained in force, Dr Spry could not 
be considered as a beneficiary of the Trust and he could not apply its assets in his own 
favour.  Therefore the assets in the Trust were not the property of the husband.  Heydon J 
agreed.  Keifel J164 was more explicit in her agreement with Finn J but French CJ 
  
163  “Spry’s case:  Exploring the limits of discretionary trusts” above n 130 at p 177-178. 
164  Spry above n 162 at [196] Keifel J. 
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expressly left open the correctness of the approach to reinstatement of Dr Spry as a 
beneficiary.  Therefore four of the five judges held that, whilst the 1983 deed remained in 
effect, Dr Spry was not a beneficiary and the assets of the Trust could not be treated as 
property of him being one of the parties to the marriage. 
 
Nevertheless the wife succeeded on the appeal and the reasoning of the High Court 
majority of French CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ illustrates the way that the meaning of 
‘property’ has been developed in the context of a discretionary trust.  The majority took 
different approaches to the ‘property’ in question.  French CJ’s approach was expansive 
and consistent with his reasoning in Re: Richstar whereas the joint decision of Gummow 
and Hayne gave property a purposeful meaning but more confined to the facts of the case. 
 
French CJ held that the relevant property were the trust assets165 “…coupled with the 
trustee’s power, prior to the 1998 instrument to appoint them to her and her equitable 
right to due consideration, that should be regarded as the relevant property “and he then 
concluded:166 
 
For so long as Dr Spry retained the legal title to the trust fund coupled with the 
power to appoint the whole of the fund to his wife and her equitable right, it 
remained, in my opinion, property of the parties to the marriage for the purposes of 
the power conferred on the Family Court by s 79.  The assets would have been 
unarguably property of the marriage absent subjection to the trust. 
 
In this way French CJ recognised that whilst assets may change their legal form they 
remain wealth accumulated during the marriage partnership and the characterisation of 
that property is not automatically lost in the process of disposition to a discretionary trust. 
 
Gummow and Hayne JJ took a different approach and concluded:167 
 
… Furthermore, as an object of these powers the wife had a right in equity to due 
administration of the trust.  The existence of such a right did not depend upon 
entitlement to any fixed and transmissible beneficial interest in the trust fund.  The 
right of the wife was accompanied at least by a fiduciary duty on the part of the 
trustee, the husband, to consider whether and in what way he should exercise the 
power conferred by clause 6. 
  
165  Spry above n 162 at [62] French CJ. 
166  At [66] French CJ. 
167  At [125] Gummow and Hayne JJ. 




The fact that the husband could not confer benefits on himself meant that whilst he did 
not have property in the assets of the trust he nevertheless had the power to benefit the 
wife and in this way Their Honours found:168 
 
Reference was made earlier in these reasons to the comprehensive sense in which the 
term ‘property’ is defined in s 4(1) of the Act.  And it will also be recalled that the 
‘property’ which may be the subject of orders under s 79(1) of the Act is “the 
property of the parties of the marriage or either of them”.  … The right of the wife 
with respect to the due administration of the trust was included in her property for 
the purposes of the Act.  …. And in considering what is the property of the parties to 
the marriage (as distinct from what might be identified as the property of the 
husband) it is important to recognise not only that the right of the wife was 
accompanied at least by the fiduciary duty of the husband to consider whether and in 
what way the power should be exercised, but also that, during the marriage, the 
power could have been exercised by appointing the whole of the trust assets to the 
wife.  
 
The Court also had to consider the position of the wife after the divorce.  The husband 
argued that following the divorce the wife had no further interest in the trust as she could 
not fall within the definition of a beneficiary.  Despite the lack of a beneficial status at the 
time of the hearing the court was prepared to consider her position ‘as if’ – “… changes 
to property rights ... had not occurred.”169  
 
Heydon J in dissent took the orthodox position and he started from the proposition that as 
the wife did not apply to set aside the 1983 instrument (which deprived the husband of 
any beneficial interest in the trust) then neither she nor her husband had any entitlement 
to the trust’s income or capital unless the husband in ‘his absolute discretion’ decided 
otherwise.  They were both the “object of a bare fiduciary power of appointment”170  and 
consequently he accepted the husband’s argument that the application before the court 
related to land, shares and money and not to the rights to have those assets duly 
administered.  
 
The outcome of the case was that the earlier dispositions in 1998 and 2002 were set aside 
and in accordance with the earlier judgments Dr Spry was personally ordered to pay his 
  
168  Spry above n 162 at [126] Gummow and Hayne JJ. 
169  At [129]. 
170  At [149]. 
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former wife $2,182,302.171  If Dr Spry wanted to satisfy his obligations by recourse to the 
trust assets then he could apply to the court for an appropriate order.172 
 
However, Dr Spry did not pay the ordered sum and refused to apply to the court for an 
order that the trust made a distribution to satisfy the judgment debt.  In 2009 the facts of 
the case returned to the Family Court of Australia in Stephens v Stephens173 on the 
primary question as to whether any order could be made attaching to the assets of the 
trust.  The court held that the FLA permitted such an order “that enables a party to the 
marriage who is in control of the trust to satisfy his or her personal liability to the other 
party to the marriage who is an object of the trust from the assets of the trust.” 174 
 
As the facts in Spry were unusual it has been suggested that – “the precise ratio of the 
decision is impossible to state, perhaps little harm will be done.  On one view it could be 
read down as an eccentric view on the width of ‘property’ as a term under the Family 
Law Act.”175   
 
However, Justin Gleeson SC explained the ratio as represented by the reasons of 
Gummow and Hayne JJ supported and expanded by French CJ as follows:176 
 
(a) Where at the date of commencement of the matrimonial cause, one party to 
the marriage has power under the trust instrument to appoint the entirety of the 
property in favour of the other party as one of the class of discretionary 
objects, the whole of the assets of the trust fall within the description of 
‘property’ of the parties to the marriage to either of them” within s 79, and at 
full value; 
 
(b) It is within the power of the court to make an order for the payment of a 
money sum which assumes that the entirety of the assets of the trust are within 
the disposition of the first party, even if at the date of resolution of the 
property settlement proceedings the other party no longer remains with the 
class of objects; 
 
  
171  Spry above n 162 at [81], [130], [137] and [140]. 
172  At [138]. 
173  Stephens v Stephens and Anor (2009) 42 Fam LR 423 at [340]. 
174  At [355]. 
175  Lee Aitken “Muddying the waters further – Kennon v Spry: ‘ownership’, ‘control’ and the 
discretionary trust” (2009) 32 Aust Bar Rev 173 at 176. 
176  “Spry’s case:  Exploring the limits of discretionary trusts” above n 130 at 183. 
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(c) Before exercising such a power, the court would consider the interests of the 
other members in the class of discretionary objects, but where they represent 
in large measure the children of the parties to the marriage and where the 
assets in the trust represent accumulated property over the life of the marriage, 
the children have no substantial claim against the making of the order. 
 
(d) Where persons other than the parties to the marriage and the children fall 
within the class of discretionary objects, they would have standing to oppose 
the order but would need to establish a proper ground upon which it would be 
just and equitable to refuse or modify such order. 
 
(e) Where such a money order is made, the court has power by way of further 
machinery orders under ss79 and 80 to order that the first party satisfy the 
liability to pay the money sum out of the assets of the trust. 
 
The major criticisms, both judicial and academic, of the majority in Spry and some of the 
earlier authorities rests on the unravelling of the orthodoxy in a way that has no historical 
parallel in equity or in law by denying the applicability of fiduciary law principles.  As 
the authors of Australian Family Law: The Contemporary Context explain it is the lack of 
adherence to an approach “that is familiar and correct to trust lawyers that is the real 
issue”.177 
 
The starting point to the criticisms of the High Court’s approach in Spry is that a 
discretionary beneficiary can have a proprietary interest in the assets of a discretionary 
trust. Traditionalists remain loyal to the rule in Gartside, that an object of a bare power of 
appointment cannot have a proprietary interest in those assets, “but only a mere 
expectancy or hope that one day the power will be exercised in that object’s favour”.178 
Prior to appointment in their favour a discretionary beneficiary only has a right to due 
administration of the trust which is not a property right to the assets of the trust. 
  
The next level of criticism looks at the proposition that, whilst trustees may have 
opportunities to misuse their office, it cannot be assumed that they will misuse their 
powers to gain a financial advantage over other beneficiaries.  The orthodox view is that 
  
177  “The contemporary context” above n 124 at p 483. 
178  Kennon v Spry (2008) 251 ALR 257 at [160]. 
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this is the very reason that equity has developed stringent rules “restraining the self-
interest of trustees and keeping them within the ambit of their powers”.179  
 
Even if it is assumed the spouse/trustee will make self-serving distributions then courts 
should not notionally include trust assets which have been unlawfully obtained.  The 
analogy is to consider a situation where a spouse includes in the property pool assets 
which have been stolen at work.180  The proper response should be that the spouse/trustee 
should be restrained from the wrong of breaching fiduciary duties and/or become liable 
for unlawfully receiving or dealing with trust property.  
 
Other criticisms are that labels such as alter egos, ‘puppets’, or ‘creature’ do not amount 
to ‘ownership’ of the trust’s assets.181  Phrases such as ‘de facto ownership’ and 
‘effective ownership’ mean that they may be in as good a position as if they were the 
beneficial owners but that does not establish actual beneficial ownership.182  
 
The outcome in Spry shows that the High Court of Australia were not moved by 
submissions based on orthodox principles of trust law, they expanded the definition of 
‘property’ rather than consider whether Dr Spry’s interest in the trust was a ‘financial 
resource’ and despite the lack of valuation evidence the Court treated the whole of the 
trust fund as property of the marriage.   
 
As can be seen the debate as to whether or not the principles in Spry are sound law 
continues.  The controversy that arises out of Australian case authorities illustrates that 
both trust and family law are competing for the same foundational right to claim 
presumptive power over the other.  In Australia, the contest has been settled and the 
meaning of property has been given trumping power over orthodox principles.   
 
The question then arises as to what significance does this have for New Zealand?  Certain 
aspects of the alter ego trusts principles are likely to be influential in the development of 
the meaning of property under the PRA.   
  
179  John Glover “Discretionary trusts, fiduciary duties and the Family Law Act:  Has the Family Court 
acted beyond power?” (2000) 14 AJFL 184 at 186. 
180  At 192. 
181  Public Trustee v Smith [2008] NSWSC 397 at [118] White J. 
182  At [138]. 
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In the next chapter the discussion moves to the meaning of property under the PRA and 
considers the concept of property interests arising out of a ‘bundle of rights’ in a 
discretionary trust. 
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V New Zealand the Meaning of Property and ‘Bundle of Rights’ Theory 
A The Definition of Property and Owner 
 
This chapter considers the meaning of ‘property’ under the PRA and in particular the 
circumstances where a spouse or partner may have a property interest in a discretionary 
trust. 
 
In order to understand what property can be affected by obligations owed under the 
PRA183 it is necessary to identify what constitutes ‘property,’ who owns it and if property 
whether it is classified as either relationship or separate property.184 
 
The PRA, as a whole, distinguishes between what may be relationship/separate property 
from assets owned by third parties.  The Act provides immunity against claims against 
the legal owner of a trust fund in a number of ways.  Firstly, s 4B185 specifically provides 
that the Act does not affect the law that applies “where either the spouse or de facto 
partner is acting as trustee under any deed or will” and secondly s 19186 expressly 
provides that nothing in the Act shall “affect the title of any third person to any property.” 
At first glance these provisions appear conclusive in that the Family Court has no 
jurisdiction to consider trust assets or the position of a spouse or partner who is also a 
trustee.  As will be seen the position with discretionary trusts is more complex. 
  
The Act defines property as including:187 
 
(a) real property; 
(b) personal property; 
(c) any estate or interest in any real property or personal property; 
(d) any debt or anything in action; 
(e) any other right or interest 
 
The focus of this dissertation is on the meaning of ‘any other right or interest’ and for the 
reasons discussed in chapter 2 a property right describes a certain type of relationship 
  
183  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (“the Act”). 
184  Nicola Peart (ed) Brookers Family Law – Family Property (loose leafed, Brookers) at [TU9.01] 
[Brookers Family Law”]. 
185  Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 4 and s 4B. 
186  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 19. 
187  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 2 (my emphasis). 
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between a legal entity and an asset188 and the degree of protection afforded to that right 
will be indicative of whether or not it has the status of property.  In contrast an interest is 
conceptually more uncertain than a right and in Leedale (Inspector of Taxes) v Lewis 
Lord Wilberforce said:189 
 
The word ‘interest’ is one of uncertain meaning and it remains to be decided on the 
terms of the applicable statute which, or possibly what other, meaning the word may 
bear. 
 
In New Zealand, property has been given an expansive meaning in the context of the 
PRA.  In Mackenzie v Mackenzie190 Doogue J held that “[t]he word “property” is not 
defined in the Act in any narrow or legalistic way, but rather as “including” certain 
defined matters to extend the meaning which might otherwise be given to it.”191. 
Consequently, property includes a beneficial interest in the assets of a partnership192 even 
in circumstances where that interest remains undivided, unallocated and subject to 
regulation by the Partnership Act.193 
 
As the authors of Brookers Family Law – Family property note194 “things to which rights 
can attach under the Act are extremely wide” and are not confined by conventional 
property law.   
 
However, for an item identified as ‘property’ a spouse or partner must be its beneficial 
owner.  Owner is defined as:195 
 
In respect of any property means the person who, apart from this Act, is the 
beneficial owner of the property under any enactment or rule of common law or 
equity. 
 
The authors of Brookers Family Law – Family Property discuss the term ‘beneficial 
owner’ in s 2 and note that:196  
  
188  Brookers Family Law above n 184 at [TU9.01]. 
189  Leedale (Inspector of Taxes) v Lewis [1982] 3 All ER 810 at 816. 
190  Mackenzie v Mackenzie [1992] NZFLR 120. 
191  At p 127. 
192  Maw v Maw [1981] 1 NZLR 25, 26. 
193  Rose v Rose [2009] 3 NZLR 1 at [32]. 
194  Brookers Family Law above n 184 at [TU9.01]. 
195  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 2. 




The use of this expression in the Act is slightly confusing because it is otherwise 
usually used in contradistinction to the expression ‘legal ownership’.  The distinction 
only exists where some form of settlement dividing absolute ownership into legal 
and equitable estates has occurred.  The expression ‘beneficial owner’ used in s 2 
necessarily includes the ‘absolute owner’ of property as well as those who hold an 
equitable interest in property. 
 
The question is whether the use of modern discretionary trust creates a type of beneficial 
ownership in circumstances where the division between legal and equitable estates is 
blurred because the purpose of the discretionary trust is to create “the illusion of separate 
ownership.”197  
 
A similar question has been raised by the Law Commission “where settlors never intend 
to give up control or beneficial ownership”198 of property transferred into a trust.  The 
proposition is that there may be grounds to invalidate a trust based on a lack of the 
equitable requirement for certainty of intention and the settlor has retained ‘effective 
ownership’ of the assets.  Whether the courts would be prepared to invalidate trusts in 
this way is debateable but it is the writer’s view that the same considerations arise when 
considering if ‘effective ownership’ means beneficial ownership under the PRA. 
 
B ‘Rights and Interests’ in Discretionary Trusts 
 
In recent years there has been a growing body of judicial opinion that rights and interests 
of one or both spouses or partners in a discretionary trust may be susceptible to claims 
under the Act.199  For instance, in B v M Allan J said:200  
 
It is certainly arguable that the definition of the term ‘property’ in s 2 is sufficiently 
wide to cover the rights and interests of a spouse as a beneficiary under a 
discretionary trust.  The difficulty lies in the valuation of that interest. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
196  Brookers Family Law above n 184 at [TU 9.01]. 
197   “The Law of Trusts in the Family Court” above n 145 at p 4, 6-7. 
198  Law Commission: “Some issues with the use of trusts in New Zealand:  Review of the law of 
trusts second issues paper” (NZLC IP20, 2010) at 5.32. 
199  Brookers Family Law above n 184 at [10.03]. 
200   B v M [2005] NZFLR 730 at [98] (HC). 
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The possibility that such rights and interests could be given property status is almost 
revolutionary to a lawyer steeped in equitable principles and given the conventional 
orthodox view expressed by the Court of Appeal in Hunt v Muollo201 that: 
 
It is generally regarded as settled law that a discretionary beneficiary’s interest in a 
normal discretionary trust is no more than a mere expectancy.  It is simply an 
expectation or hope (in Latin a spes) that the trustee’s discretion may be exercised in 
the beneficiary’s favour … an ordinary discretionary beneficiary has no interest, 
legal or equitable in the assets of the trust … it is only on the making of a 
distribution to the discretionary beneficiary that the beneficiary obtains any interest 
in property, and then only to the extent of the distribution. 
 
In Hunt v Muollo the Court of Appeal had to consider whether the interests of a 
discretionary beneficiary in a trust is a species of property capable of coming within the 
meaning  of ‘assets’ or ‘means’ pursuant the High Court Rules.202  The Court held that 
the “rule must be construed and applied in the context of the general law of property.  If 
the position were otherwise the ambit of the rule would have no clear or principled 
boundary.”203  It does however remain possible that the Court of Appeal has not finally 
determined this issue because this often quoted passage states that the law is “generally” 
settled and also refers to “a normal discretionary trust”. 
 
This leaves open the possibility that an ‘abnormal’ discretionary trust may be one where 
the beneficiary effectively controls the trustees’ power of selection.204  If the law 
develops in this way then it will carve out a general exception to the presumption that a 
discretionary beneficiary has no more than a mere expectancy. 
 
In Nation v Nation205 the Court of Appeal considered whether the interests of a 
discretionary beneficiary could constitute relationship property and took the traditional 
approach when it held:206 
 
  
201  Hunt v Muollo [2003] 2 NZLR 322 at [11]. 
202  High Court Rules r 621(2). 
203  Hunt v Muollo [2003] 2 NZLR 322 at [13]. 
204  Re Richstar above n 157-159 at p 43 where French J carved out an exception to the rule in 
Gartside v IRC [1968] AC 553. 
205   Nation v Nation [2005] 3 NZLR 46 referring to Hunt v Muollo [2003] 2 NZLR 322 and Johns v 
Johns [2004] 3 NZLR 202. 
206  At [74]. 
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The conventional view is that a discretionary beneficiary has no legal or equitable 
interest in the assets of the trust until the trustees have exercised their discretion in 
favour of the particular beneficiary  
 
Again there may be some room to doubt that this issue has been finally settled in the 
context of cases under the PRA because of the way that particular case had been argued 
and the evidence placed before the Courts.207    
 
In Johns v Johns208 the Court of Appeal considered the meaning of the term “future 
interest” under The Limitation Act 1950.  The relevant section provided that the statutory 
period of limitation would accrue in the following circumstances:209 
 
Provided that the right of action shall not be deemed to have accrued to any 
beneficiary entitled to a future interest in the trust property until the interest fell into 
possession. 
 
The Court of Appeal found that the plaintiff had three different interests in the trust 
property being: his interest as a discretionary beneficiary,210 his residual interest211 and 
his income interest in the trust fund.212  In respect to the plaintiff’s discretionary interest 
the Court of Appeal upheld its earlier decision in Hunt v Muollo213 and also referred to 
Armitage v Nurse214 a UK case involving an equivalent Limitation Act proviso215 and 
held:216 
 
We respectfully agree that a right of that kind cannot properly be regarded as an 
“interest” in the trust property, whether present or future, for the purposes of the 
proviso to s 21(2).  …  They [counsel’s submissions] cannot be reconciled with the 
authorities mentioned, or indeed with conventional concepts of what amounts to an 
  
207  The case on appeal was largely concerned with the application of s 44C Property (Relationships) 
Act 1976 and even that issue proved problematic because the Trust Deed was never produced and 
there was no valuation evidence. 
208  Johns v Johns [2004] 3 NZLR 202 (CA). 
209  The Limitation Act 1950 s 21(2). 
210  Johns v Johns [2004] 3 NZLR 202 at [26] per Tipping J. 
211  At [27]. 
212  At [28]. 
213  Hunt v Muollo above n 201. 
214  Armitage v Nurse [1988] Ch 241. 
215  The Limitation Act 1950, s 21(2). 
216  Johns v Johns above n 208 at [33]. 
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interest in trust property.  That interest must be either legal or equitable.  It cannot 
extend to the so-called interest of a discretionary beneficiary which is neither legal 
nor equitable. 
 
However, Tipping J said that in Armitage v Nurse Millett LJ emphasised the uncertainty 
of the meaning of the word ‘interest’217and that the word must be ascertained from the 
legislative purpose in the relevant statute in which the word ‘interest’ appears.   Tipping J 
added that a “discretionary beneficiary may well be able to bring proceedings to compel 
proper administration of the trust … that although a discretionary beneficiary has no 
proprietary interest in the trust assets he has sufficient standing to compel proper 
administration of the trust.”218 
 
On the issue of the residual interest the Court of Appeal held that in that case the ‘future 
interest’ was property and it did not matter that the interest “is contingent on survival to 
the date of distribution and on their being trust property available for distribution at that 
time does not prevent it from being an interest.219  Further Tipping J said: 
 
The proper interpretation of the expression “future interest” for the purposes of the 
proviso must recognise the vital importance of the context, as Millett LJ emphasised 
in Armitage v Nurse.   …. The crucial difference between contingent and vested 
interests on the one hand and discretionary interests on the other is that possession of 
the former interests if enjoyed at all, is enjoyed as of right; whereas discretionary 
interests are never enjoyed as of right; their enjoyment is always subject to the 
discretion of the trustees.   
 
Hunt v Muollo220 and Johns v Johns221 were cases involving factual situations which have 
been considered in the context of general legislative provisions.  The question this 
dissertation considers is whether these authorities are necessarily applicable to the PRA.   
 
C ‘Bundle of Rights’ – Valuation of Debts 
 
Since Nation the Court of Appeal has introduced a further strand to the meaning of 
property with the development of the concept that a spouse or partner may have a ‘bundle 
  
217  Armitage v Nurse above n 214. 
218  Johns v Johns above n 208 at [34]. 
219  At [45]. 
220  At [49]. 
221  Hunt v Muollo above n 201. 
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of rights’ in the management of a discretionary trust which is property within the 
meaning of the PRA.   
 
The development of this line of authority raises fundamental questions as to whether 
exceptions are being carved out of the conventional view expressed in Gartside,222 Hunt 
v Muollo,223 and Nation224 and this requires careful examination. 
 
In Walker v Walker225 the Court of Appeal considered a question regarding the valuation 
of a debt owed to the husband by a discretionary family trust.  The debt was relationship 
property and arose because the Trust had purchased the husband’s shares in his company 
and a property that was jointly owned by the spouses.  The trustee was a company of 
which the husband was the sole director, but both spouses held the power to appoint and 
remove trustees as well as the directors of the trustee company.  The spouses were 
discretionary beneficiaries of the trust.  When they separated the husband wanted to carry 
on the business and buy the wife out of the debt which then had to be valued.   
 
The Court of Appeal held that private debts should be valued as any other asset, but 
taking into account that a spouse or partner is not an independent third party and may not 
want to realise the debt immediately.  More importantly, the debt was related to a 
“package”226 of assets that included the shares as well as the couple’s discretionary 
interests in the trust and their power to appoint and remove trustees and company 
directors.   
 
Apart from the implications this ‘package of assets’ has on the meaning of property it 
also raises important factors that the court should consider when assessing the value of 
the debt, namely:  Can a private debt be anything less or more than its face value?  When 
should it be valued?  What factors need to be taken into account on valuation?  Chambers 
J said:227 
 
We agree the fact the debt is a private debt can lead to complications in valuation.  
For instance, if a debt owed by a family trust cannot be paid or can be paid only in 
part, the devaluation of the debt may be compensated for, at least in part, by an 
  
222  Gartside v IRC (1968) AC 553. 
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increase in value of one party’s or both party’s interests in the trust – whether his, 
her or their interests as settlor, trustee, appointor or beneficiary, which interests may 
be relationship property.  
 
Consequently the Court rejected an argument that a debt could never be less than its face 
value.  The Court noted that a debt could fall in value if the trust has not the means to 
repay it and it may rise in value again if the trust’s fortunes improve.228  The debt needed 
to be valued at the date of hearing.229  Importantly, attached to the debt the husband 
would retain: directorship of the trustee company; shares of the trustee company; power 
to appoint and remove directors of the trustee company; power to appoint and remove 
trustees of the trust and the parties’ discretionary interests under the trust.230 
 
Although the value of the debt increased as a consequence of the husband’s skill and 
labour the Court was of the view that was only a part of the reason for the increase in 
value.  The company had employees, all of whom would have contributed to the 
restoration of profitability.  The company benefited from its capital base (which had been 
contributed by the parties to the relationship) and by the fact the wife had not insisted on 
repayment of the loan.  The wife thereby effectively provided free working capital to the 
business with no prospect of any equity return and in circumstances where the best return 
she could have hoped for was the face value of the debt.  The husband’s skills in 
managing the company had been honed and fostered during the marriage as he had been 
freed from the domestic responsibilities which had been undertaken by his wife.231 
 
The face value of the debt was not the correct methodology of valuation because it 
erroneously assumed that that an independent third party will be the buyer.232  It also 
ignored the possibility that the parties themselves may be prepared to offer more for the 
debt than an independent third party233 and a party to a relationship may not want an 
immediate payment but rather its long term potential.234 
 
The heart of the valuation issue was explained by Chambers J when he found:235 
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Thirdly, it is wrong to focus on the debt in isolation to the rest of the package. 
Clearly all six items of property forming the package should have been valued on an 
assumption that they were for sale together.  That would be a reasonable assumption 
in terms of maximising the value of the relationship property, for, as we have said, 
together they confer control of the company. 
 
The concept that the husband had ‘control’ over the corporate trustee company was 
central to the Court’s assessment of the value of the relationship property debt.  This 
sentiment is also reminiscent of the High Court of Australia’s approach In the Marriage 
of Ashton236 where the husband’s control of the trust amounted to the trust being the alter 
ego of the husband.   
 
Then in Harrison v Harrison237 the High Court took the position further when it 
considered an appeal on an application for interim distribution of relationship property.  
In that case the major assets, being home and a half share in a profitable business, had 
been transferred to a family trust.  The settlor was the husband and wife and the trustee a 
company Cappa Harrison Trust Company Ltd (CHTC).  There were relationship debts 
owed to the parties by the CHTC of approx $602,000.   
 
Fogarty J looked at the ‘substantial effect of the arrangement’238  He went through the 
deed which provided wide discretionary powers and he found that the parties ‘control the 
trustees’.239 As the trustee company was under the complete control of the parties he 
concluded:240  
 
In short the husband and wife have the ability at any time, without the need to give 
any reason to the other contingent beneficiaries, to vest the entire assets of the ‘trust’ 
to themselves.  It appears that the intention of the husband and wife when entering 
into the deed was to retain complete control over the use and enjoyment of all the 
assets transferred to the trustee, until at some later date when they might decide to 
transfer some or all of the assets to other persons.  Given the ability and the apparent 
intention, there is a serious argument which the parties may yet engage in, that, upon 
a substantive analysis, for the time being the legal and equitable estates unite in the 
husband and wife. 
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Fogarty J then somewhat controversially said:241 
 
In situations where an entity such as CHTC holds the assets, but later a trust is not 
recognised by the Court, the entity can be treated by the Court as merely an 
instrument of the true owners, sometimes described as a puppet or alter ego. 
 
As this was an appeal from an interim distribution of relationship property it was not 
appropriate for the Court to make final findings as to whether the trust was ineffective as 
the Court still had the option of considering the value of debts owed to the parties in 
CHTC. 
 
An application was then made for Leave to Appeal to Court of Appeal which was 
granted242 but the husband did not prosecute the appeal and in December 2009, the stay 
lapsed and the appeal was struck out.  Importantly, Robertson J said in granting leave:243 
 
There was also a bundle of rights associated with their positions as discretionary 
beneficiaries under the CHFT and as joint holders of the power of appointment of 
the CHFT  
 
Nevertheless, “the legal structures which the parties have mutually created must be the 
starting point for an assessment of what property is available for distribution at an interim 
stage.”244  
 
It is unfortunate that the Harrison case did not go on to an appeal because the boundaries 
around the doctrine of the ‘bundle of rights’ need clarification.  
 
By way of example, Judge L J Ryan in SMB v GAC245 considered a situation where a de 
facto partner transferred his interest in a superannuation scheme into a discretionary trust 
and throughout the relationship he continued to make contributions to the scheme out of 
his income.   He was a discretionary beneficiary and had power to appoint and remove 
  
241  At [28]. 
242  Harrison v Harrison [2009] NZFLR 687 (CA). 
243  At [10]. 
244  At [22]. 
245  SMB v GAC FC, North Shore, 19 November 2010, FAM-2007-044-000946 Judge L J Ryan. 
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trustees.246  In these circumstances the de facto partner ‘controlled’ the trust and Judge 
Ryan held:247 
 
I regard the respondent’s total control of the trust combined with his rights as a 
discretionary beneficiary as amounting to a “package of rights” as that term is used 
by the Court of Appeal.  As such it is property as defined in the Act.    
 
The difficulty with this conclusion is that it is not entirely clear from Walker if the Court 
of Appeal intended the “package of rights” to be considered independently to the 
valuation of the debt.  Chambers J refers to - “... five items of property, plus the debt 
formed a very valuable package, as together they confer control of the company.”248 
 
Until the boundaries surrounding the “bundle of rights’ doctrine are clarified there will be 
continuing conjecture as to the types of ‘interests’ in discretionary trusts which give rise 
to property rights.  Nevertheless, it is the writer’s view, drawing on the discussion in the 
last two chapters, that effective ‘control’ is likely to give rise to a property interest.  It is 
for this reason that the Australian concept of alter ego trusts is similar to the ‘bundle of 
rights’ doctrine but with the caution that it is unlikely that the Courts in New Zealand will 
declare (as in the High Court decision of Harrison) that such trusts are ineffective as this 
could lead to a situation where discretionary trusts may generally collapse under attacks 
from third party claims.   
 
Instead the Walker case finds a middle ground, within the context of family law claims, 
which recognises that the wealth created during the relationship is still available when the 
parties cease to live together because one (or both) ‘control’ not only the trust but the 
ability to benefit from that wealth.  In these circumstances the illusion of separate 
ownership by a third party trust is cast aside in the valuation process.   The relationship 
property enquiry remains in conventional territory as the focus rests on the value of the 
debt-back and all the components which are related to the debt.   
 
This approach is also similar to that taken in Z v Z (No.2)249 which involved the valuation 
of the husband’s ‘bundle of rights’ in a legal partnership in circumstances where on the 
face of the partnership agreement his interest in the goodwill of the firm had a no value.  
  
246  At [35]. 
247  At [40]. 
248  Walker v Walker above n 225 [49] (my emphasis). 
249  Z v Z (No.2) 2 NZLR 258 (CA) and discussed in chapter 2 above. 
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These cases also draw on the Australian position by looking at the social reality that the 
disposition of assets to a discretionary trust does not mean that wealth has lost its 
character as ‘property of the parties to the marriage”.250  
 
D Gift Duty 
 
Before leaving this line of valuation cases it is important to pause and consider how the 
concept of a ‘bundle of rights’ will be affected by the Government‘s decision to introduce 
legislation abolishing gift duty from 1 October 2011.251  If there are no consequential 
amendments to the PRA then debts owed by discretionary trusts could be forgiven in one 
lump sum.  In these circumstances a valuable asset will no longer exist at the end of the 
marriage, civil union or de facto relationship, and leaving aside the ‘bundle of rights’ 
principles, it may not be possible to claw back the original source of relationship property 
into the pool of property.  
 
Currently, a trust can avoid gift duty either by paying for the asset or acknowledging the 
purchase price as a debt back to the original owner(s) (“donor”).  The donor can then gift 
the value of the asset to the trust either in one lump sum or by instalments of $27,000 per 
donor per annum.  If the gift is in one lump sum then gift duty is payable in accordance 
with the legislation.252 Most family discretionary trusts do not have the capital to 
purchase assets outright and generally the debt back to the original owner is preferred 
with a gifting programme.  
 
In this way gift duty has had a significant impact on trust practice in New Zealand.  These 
practices have a number of advantages in relationship property cases:  assets are valued at 
the time of disposition and generally a record is kept of the market value at that time and 
the debt to the original owner is quantified and usually recorded by way of a deed of 
acknowledgement of debt.  Once a spouse(s) or partner(s) enter into a gifting programme 
a record is kept of the gifts with corresponding deeds of reduction of debt.  This process 
not only means that dispositions of property to trusts may take many years but also 
provides a financial and evidential trail of gifts.  Depending when the trust was settled the 
debt back may be the only substantial asset in existence at separation.   Consequently, if 
  
250  Kennon v Spry (2008) 251 ALR 257 at [65] per French CJ. 
251  “IRD Minister Peter Dunne “Announces abolishment of gift duty from October 1, 2011” 
(1 November 2010) www.interest.co.nz. 
252  Estate & Gift Duties Act 1968 s 62, Schedule: Scale of rates of gift duty. 
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the Gift Duty is abolished debts owed to parties may be immediately forgiven and the 
valuation exercise set out in the Walker case may become redundant.  
 
Another issue is that the gifting process requires the donor to participate in the gifting 
programme each year which in turn gives an opportunity for the individual to consider 
whether or not to continue with the gifting process.  So at least there is an opportunity for 
individuals to obtain advice as to their legal position with a gifting programme as or if 
their circumstances change.   
 
The distinction between gifts and loans has been the subject of dispute under the PRA in 
relation to sums of money that have created relationship property.   Often these disputes 
arise when a member of the family provides a lump sum payment which goes towards the 
acquisition of property.  When the relationship ends in separation or death an issue arises 
as to whether or not the funds were loans or a gift; the former but not the latter fall under 
the regime of debt sharing under the PRA.253    
 
A gift has been described as a “present made without return of any kind”254 and its 
distinguishing feature is the absence of valuable consideration. The essential elements of 
a gift are:255 
 
(i) an intention to transfer the immediate ownership of the property or, where 
the legal title is retained, to relinquish immediately the beneficial ownership 
in favour of the donee;  
(ii) an act or acts adequate to give complete effect to that intention; and  
(iii) acceptance of the gift by the donee. 
 
The courts have approached these disputes on a case by case basis and much depends on 
the evidence of whether there was the requisite intention to create a gift at the time of the 
advance.  The courts have given due weight to documentary evidence but at the same 
time it has not been determinative of the issue.256 For instance, in a case involving the 
disposition of a spouse’s separate property to a discretionary trust an issue arose as to 
  
253  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 20D. 
254  Rennell v IRC [1964] AC 173 at 192 per Lord Radcliffe. 
255  NZ Forms & Precedents (looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [2504] referring to Williams v Williams 
[1956] NZLR 970. 
256  Young v Young [2000] NZFLR 128 at 134 and N v N [Division of Property] [2009] NZFLR 757 
but subsequently overturned on appeal N v N [Relationship Property: loan] [2010] NZFLR 161 
(HC). 
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whether or not the wife consented to the disposition257 and in that case the court found 
that she acquiesced but did not consent and consequently there was no gift.  The lack of 
independent legal advice was a significant factor. 
 
Recently, the Supreme Court has considered the distinction between consent and 
acquiescence in Cashmere Capital Ltd v Carroll258 McGrath J referred to an earlier Court 
of Appeal case in both New Zealand259 and quoting from Shaw LJ in Bell v Alfred Franks 
& Bartlett Co Ltd260 he held261: 
 
If acquiescence is something passive in the face of knowledge, what does ‘consent’ 
mean?  …  The only sense in which there can be implied consent is where consent is 
demonstrated, not by language but by some positive act other than words which 
amount to an affirmation of what is being done and goes beyond mere acquiescence 
in it …  
 
Consequently, there may be situations where a spouse or de facto partner has no 
independent legal advice and in those circumstances there may be grounds to consider 
whether the spouse or partner did consent to gifting a debt-back to the trust.  
 
Alternatively, the common law has always recognised that a gift can be set aside on the 
grounds of fraud, duress, undue influence, mistake or incapacity.262 The grounds of fraud 
and undue influence are most likely to give rise to applications to set the gift aside under 
the PRA.  The issue of fraud is discussed in more detail at chapter 6 when considering 
applications to set aside dispositions to trusts263 but there is no statutory ground of undue 
influence under the PRA.  
 
In Attorney-General for England and Wales v R264 the Court of Appeal considered the 
general principles of undue influence and the classic situation in which equity intervened 
  
257  Fraser v Buxton FC, Wellington, FAM-2005-085-000919, 23 April 2008 Judge J Johnston. 
258  Cashmere Capital Ltd v Carroll (on appeal from Cashmere Capital Ltd v Crossdale Properties 
Ltd) [2010] 1 NZLR 577 (SC). 
259  NZ Fisheries Ltd v Napier City Council (1990) 1 NZ ConvC at 190, 342 and 344 (CA). 
260  Bell v Alfred Franks & Bartlett Co Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 340. 
261  At [77] and [78] McGrath J. 
262  NZ Forms & Precedents above n 254 at [2520]. 
263  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 44. 
264  Attorney-General for England and Wales v R [2002] 2 NZLR 91, [70] to [82] Tipping J (CA). 
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when the relationship between the parties was one of trust and confidence. Tipping J 
referred to the leading English cases and held:265 
 
... Cases in class 1 represent those in which the plaintiff can affirmatively prove 
actual undue influence.  Class 2 involves cases in which undue influence is 
presumed unless it can be rebutted.  In class 1 cases, the party asserting undue 
influence (X) proves that the other party (Y) in fact exerted undue influence upon X 
to enter into the impugned transaction.  Cases within class 2 fall into two sub-
classes.  Class 2(A) involves certain relationships (such as solicitor and client or 
doctor and patient) which give rise to a legal presumption of undue influence.  
Class 2(B) represents cases in which although the relationship between X and Y is 
not of itself such as to raise a legal presumption of undue influence, X can show that 
there existed such a relationship of trust and confidence between the parties and the 
transaction was of such manifest disadvantage to X that it can reasonably be 
presumed that Y did in fact exert undue influence on X to enter into the impugned 
transaction. 
  
However, Tipping J went on to say that the position of Class 2(B) cases had been 
modified by the House of Lords in Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge266in that whilst:267  
 
“[t]he relationship may give rise to a presumption of trust and confidence, but not a 
presumption that such trust and confidence was abused by the exercise of undue 
influence.  But when the nature of the transaction calls for explanation in the light of 
the relationship between the parties the evidential onus shifts to the defendant to 
demonstrate the absence of undue influence.  The concept of manifest disadvantage 
which had caused some difficulties was thus retained as a relevant factor in the 
overall evidential assessment but was abandoned as a separate criterion. 
 
As a consequence, when spouses or de facto partners sign a deed confirming their 
intention to gift the entirety of debt to a discretionary trust it may be possible to assert 
that the transaction is tainted by undue influence.  A lot will depend on the facts in each 
case but if there is little or no explanation given to the donor that the gifting may 
extinguish a valuable relationship property asset then it may be open to the courts to set 
aside the gift and then return the debt-back to the relationship property pool.  
 
  
265  At [71] Tipping J. 
266  Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2001] 4 All ER 449. 
267  At [72]. 
67 Relationship Property and Trusts: The “Bundle of Rights” Theory  
 
 
Against this background the PRA recognises that parties are entitled to “deal with or 
dispose of any property”268 during the relationship and there is no requirement that 
parties must have independent legal advice before disposing of assets into a discretionary 
trust.  Therefore the process of challenging a gift is not straightforward.   
 
In conclusion, the existence of gift duty has been a major inhibitor to the gifting of debts 
owed to spouses or partners by discretionary trusts.  Once gift duty is abolished there is a 
strong likelihood that debts-back will be forgiven and there are then two ways a 
prejudiced party may be able to claw-back the lost wealth into the relationship property 
pool: either the gift is set aside on the basis of lack of consent, fraud or undue influence 
or the courts adopt an approach similar to Kennon v Spry by finding that a party who has 
‘control’ of a discretionary trust has a proprietary interest in the trust fund.  This will take 
the Walker v Walker principles one step further towards expanding the definition of 
property and establishing case authority that ‘control’ of a discretionary trust is not 
confined to valuation principles.  
 
If these options do not apply then the abolition of gift duty will further exacerbate the 
situation which already exists when there is an insufficient pool of property to grant 
compensation to a disadvantaged party.269 
 
E ‘Bundle of Rights’ – Occupation Orders 
 
Another line of Family Court cases has developed over the practical problem of who is to 
occupy the family home following a separation when that property is owned by a third 
party trust(s).  Section 27(1) of the PRA provides:270 
 
The Court may make an order granting to either spouse or partner, for such period or 
periods and on such terms and subject to such conditions as the Court thinks fit, the 
right personally to occupy the family home or any other premises forming part of the 
relationship property. 
 
The issues the courts have considered are whether a trust property could be the family 
home or form part of the relationship property. There have been three decisions which 
take different approaches.   
  
268  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 19(a). 
269  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 44C and discussed at Chapter 6. 
270  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 27(1). 




In Gao v Elledge271 the Family Court considered an application for an occupation order 
could be made in circumstances where both parties were settlors and beneficiaries of a 
trust.  Judge Robinson made an occupation order in favour of the wife because she had a 
beneficial interest in the property arising from a trust settled by both parties.  On the 
question as to whether or not that beneficial interest was relationship or separate property 
the Court held that the evidence established that the property was being used as a family 
home and was therefore relationship property unless designated separate property by a s 
21 agreement272. 
 
Then in Keats v Keats273 the parties were trustees and beneficiaries of a discretionary 
trust.  The children were the final beneficiaries.  Judge P Grace adopted the conventional 
view in Hunt v Muollo274 that a discretionary beneficiary’s interest in a trust does not 
create a property interest and he concluded that such an ‘interest’ was not ‘property’.  
Guo v Elledge was distinguished on the basis that the parties were sole beneficiaries of 
the trust and therefore held the equitable interest in its assets.   
 
In R v R275 an application was made for an occupation order where the parties had settled 
two mirror trusts which controlled a partnership trust which in turn owned the family 
home.  Each party had powers of appointment, were trustees of each other’s trusts as well 
as beneficiaries along with their children.   
 
Judge Burns compared the two earlier family court decisions276 of Elledge and Keats and 
concluded that the occupation order in Elledge was made because the parties had a 
beneficial and therefore a proprietary interest in the trust’s assets.  Further, the 
beneficiaries had the power to request transfer of the property to them, and the power to 
direct the trustees to deal with the property as the beneficiaries required. 
 
On the other hand in Keats277 the court was concerned with a situation where the parties 
where two of three trustees of a purely discretionary trust and were only discretionary 
  
271  Gao v Elledge [2003] NZFLR 378 (“Elledge”). 
272  Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 10(4). 
273  Keats v Keats [2006] NZFLR 403 (“Keats”). 
274  Hunt v Muollo [2003] 2 NZLR 322 (CA). 
275  R v R [Occupation Order: Trusts] [2010] NZFLR 555. 
276  At [46]. 
277  Keats v Keats [2006] NZFLR 470. 
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beneficiaries and the occupation order was declined for the reasons explained in Hunt v 
Muollo.278 
 
Judge Burns noted in relation to the Elledge case that:279 
 
I accept … the reasoning adopted by Judge Robinson in that judgment that there can 
be cases where a relationship property interest can be found in property owned by 
trustees to provide jurisdiction for the Court to make an occupation order, i.e., the 
trustees hold the property not only pursuant to obligations under the Trust Deed, but 
in addition hold a beneficiary property interest for one or both parties or the children 
or one or both parties acquire a beneficial interest.  The situation for Trusts 
particularly in the context of a marriage or de facto relationship does not remain 
static after a Trust Deed is signed.  Often the parties continue to behave not only as 
husband and wife but as trustees, and with conduct and with change of events that 
occur during the course of a marriage further rights and obligations can arise which 
can amount to property.  The question is what type of ‘interests’ can give rise to the 
Court having jurisdiction. 
 
Judge Burns considered the meaning of the word ‘interest’ 280 and he referred to 
Armitage v Nurse281 where Millett LJ cited Lord Wilberforce in Leedale (Inspector of 
Taxes) v Lewis282 that word ‘interest’ is of uncertain meaning and has to be decided on 
the terms of the relevant statute.   Also relying on Tipping J in Johns v Johns283 Judge 
Burns then found:284 
 
Accordingly, based on the case law there is a spectrum of interests within different 
trusts.  Those interests have been defined as variously rights, powers and property.  
At one end of the continuum is a mere expectancy which does not provide a property 
interest.  At the other end of the range are a bundle of rights which can be properly 
identified as relationship property.  Keats v Keats is an example of one end of the 
spectrum and Yung Ping Guo v Elledge and Q v Q are examples along the line of the 
continuum.  Each case will have to be considered on its own merits as to where it 
  
278  Hunt v Muollo [2003] 2 NZLR 322. 
279  R v R above n 275 at [46] (my emphasis). 
280  At [51]. 
281  Armitage v Nurse [1998] CH 241. 
282  Leedale (Inspector of Taxes) v Lewis [1982] 3 All ER 810 at 816. 
283  Johns v Johns [2004] 3 NZLR 202. 
284  R v R above n 275 at [60]. 
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falls on the continuum, and the law will have to be built up on a case by case basis.  I 
cannot make a definitive general statement of the law. 
 
Judge Burns then identified the relationship property as including:285 a trustee resolution 
providing the spouses with a right to occupy the property, a distribution by the trustees to 
the parties thereby converting a discretionary interest into a property interest; the 
formation of a partnership between the two trusts and payments made by the partnership, 
the effective control held by each party by way of power of appointment; the parties are 
beneficiaries along with their children, a decision to allow the wife and children exclusive 
occupation of the home, the ownership structure whereby the trust Partnership has passed 
decision making from the two respective mirror trusts to the partnership where the 
husband and wife have exercised decision making not only as trustees but also as 
husband and wife. 
 
It was in these circumstances that the Judge explained the rationale behind the extension 
of the meaning of ‘property’ when he said:286 
 
Because trust deeds vary so much it is difficult to generalise about what does or does 
not constitute relationship property interest in a trust.  The variables are also affected 
by the context in which the property is settled on a trust.  The Family Court does get 
concerned in those circumstances where relationship property is settled on a trust 
and one party seeks to use the trust as a device in order to try and convert that 
relationship property into separate property or to retain control.  There are specific 
remedies under the Act, but the Court will be alert to ensuring that no injustice 
occurs in those circumstances where the property settled was relationship property 
prior to being settled on a trust. 
 
The next question was whether the parties’ interests in the trusts were their separate 
property.287   He noted that property acquired from a third person288 is separate property 
because the spouse is a beneficiary under a trust settled by a third person.  Therefore in 
circumstances where the parties are settlors and beneficiaries under the trust their 
interests cannot be separate property.  Judge Burns said that the amendments made to the 
Act were also significant: 
 
  
285  At [61]. 
286  At [63]. 
287  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s10. 
288  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 10(1)(a)(iv). 
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It can be seen that the words changed.  The important change was the adding of 
“from a third party”289.  In my view, this change was important and is consistent with 
the general scheme of the Act to make a distinction between separate and 
relationship property.  It is intended to capture a distinction between those cases 
where a party seeks to convert relationship property into separate property by the use 
of a trust.  It also seeks to preserve where the original source of the property was 
separate, and its status (if not held by a trust) would be separate in any event to 
preserve that distinction.  In this case the property settled on the trust was 
relationship property.  There is a debt back which is also relationship property. 
 
Taking all these matters into account Judge Burns concluded that the trust owned family 
home relationship property and he made an occupation order in favour of the wife 
particularly as she needed a home to provide for the children. 
 
Another occupation order case which raises important interpretation issues on the 
meaning of ‘property’ and ‘owner’ is M v M [Occupation Order].290 In this case the 
application was for an occupation order under the Domestic Violence Act 1995 on the 
grounds that either party  “owns or … has a legal interest ..”291 in a dwellinghouse. 
 
The question of jurisdiction depended upon the meaning of ‘owns.’  The DVA has no 
definition of ‘owner’ and s 52292 makes no mention of property but the Court found that 
when “interpreting the word ‘owns’ it raises the question of ‘owns what’?  The only 
logical answer is the word property.”293 
 
Unlike the PRA, the DVA definition includes property that a person does not own but 
“uses or enjoys.”294  Judge Burns found that the court did have jurisdiction to make an 
occupation order in a situation where the dwellinghouse was owned by a third party trust 
because: 
 
 The words ‘either party to the proceedings’ owns or in which has a legal interest, 
that the Legislature by using the word ‘owns’ or ‘had a legal interest in’ intended an 
expanded definition so that an applicant or respondent does not have to only have 
legal ownership but it also is extended to use and enjoyment.  This must be the case 
  
289  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 10(1)(a). 
290  M v M [Occupation Order] [2010] NZFLR 746. 
291  Domestic Violence Act 1995 s 52 (“DVA”). 
292  Domestic Violence Act 1995 s 52. 
293  M v M above n 290 at [35]. 
294  Domestic Violence Act 1995, s 2. 
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otherwise the words ‘legal interest’ would be redundant.  … This expanded 
definition fits in with the purpose of the Act and the requirement to provide 
protection for applicants and children. 
 
Consequently, the conventional view that property interests cannot include a 
discretionary beneficiary’s interest in a trust was discarded by accepting that, in the 
context of the DVA,  property interests in discretionary trusts occur as a consequence of 
the ‘use’ or ‘enjoyment’ of the dwellinghouse in question.  This is yet another example of 
an operative conception of property in social legislation aimed at providing protection for 
applicants and children. 
 
Returning to R v R [Occupation Order] the meaning of property depended on the terms 
of the trust deed, the conduct of the parties during the relationship as well as the degree of 
control exercised by one or both parties over the management of trust assets.  This line of 
authority in occupation orders illustrates the fluid meaning of property under the PRA but 
in circumstances where the integrity of the trust fund is not affected by the court’s order. 
Whilst the occupation order does affect the trustee’s ability to make decisions regarding 
the sale of the property, pending final determination of relationship property proceedings, 
the trust fund is not being distributed or re-allocated and there is no need for those 
property interests to be valued. 
 
However, before leaving the ‘bundle of rights’ cases it is important to consider those 
cases when interests in discretionary trusts may need to be valued.   
 
F Valuation – Interests in Discretionary Trusts 
 
This discussion on the valuation of interests in discretionary trusts is not intended to be an 
analysis of the meaning of ‘value’ or the methodologies that have been employed to value 
tangible and intangible assets under the PRA.  Instead the focus remains on the kinds of 
interests in discretionary trusts that may be given a property status and factors that may 
need to be considered when valuing those interests. 
 
Assuming that the ‘bundle of rights’ doctrine create property interests, beyond the 
valuation principles in Walker v Walker,295 then these rights need to be classified and 
  
295 Walker n 225 above. 
73 Relationship Property and Trusts: The “Bundle of Rights” Theory  
 
 
valued before there can be a division of relationship property.296  For the reasons already 
discussed, this enquiry requires a careful examination of the facts in each case as there 
will be a ‘spectrum’ of interests in discretionary trusts which may or may not have a 
value.  For instance on its own a discretionary beneficiary’s right to due administration 
and consideration is so uncertain that it is difficult to envisage any reliable methodology 
to value such an interest. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum there will be trust deeds which provide that both parties 
share the power of appointment and are discretionary beneficiaries.  In these 
circumstances it is likely that the parties will use their ‘control’ to distribute the trust 
assets between themselves irrespective of the view of any additional trustee.  
Accordingly, there is no reason to depart from the principle of equal sharing of the trust 
fund as this flows from their joint control over administration and disposition of the 
trust’s assets.  
 
However, if the trust deed provides that one party retains effective ‘control’ over the use 
and enjoyment of the trust assets and on a proper construction of the trust deed is able to 
appoint all the capital and income to him or herself or the other party297 then the 
likelihood that this party will take advantage of the trust structure and appoint some or all 
of the trust’s capital or income raises the issue of valuation of that ‘controlling’ interest.  
This necessarily gives rise to a theoretical valuation for relationship property purposes.   
 
The foundation of conventional valuation principles is to ascertain a “value at which a 
willing not but anxious vendor would sell and a willing but not anxious purchaser would 
buy.”298  However, the valuation of assets for those in qualifying relationships can arise 
where there is no market for the asset in question.  As the Court of Appeal stated in Z v Z 
(No 2) when considering theoretical valuations 299  
 
It may be that there will be great difficulty in arriving at a value but that does not 
mean that there is none.  In the end the assessment must be approached as a jury 
question with the assistance of the best evidence available. 
 
  
296  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 2G and s 20D. 
297  See the discussion at chapter 4 Kennon v Spry above n 162 at [62] French CJ. 
298  Hatrick v CIR [1963] NZLR 641, 661 (CA). 
299  Z v Z (No.2) [1997] 2 NZLR 258 at p 289.(CA). 
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Similar uncertainty and difficulty arises over the factors that need to be brought into 
account when assessing a compensation payment for economic disparity,300 as well as 
contingent events that may or may not occur in the valuation of superannuation 
entitlements301 such as widow’s benefit302 which may have considerable value if a party 
subsequently remarries.   
 
In Z v Z (No.2)303 the Court of Appeal acknowledged that as a consequence of the 
partnership deed the husband did not have a proprietary interest in the partnership’s 
capital but nevertheless his membership of the firm gave him enhanced benefits which 
flowed from his membership of the partnership. This approach has been adapted in the 
Walker valuation model of the debts owed by the trust to the parties.  The parties did not 
have a proprietary interest in the trust’s assets but their ‘control’ gave them enhanced 
benefits which flow from the “six items of property forming the package.” 304  
 
In theoretical valuations the courts have relied on well established principles such as an 
“approach akin to that identifying super profits,”305 adjustments for future contingencies 
such as life expectancy, medical disablement, loss of employment and the like 306 to 
reach a value of the particular asset which accords with the principles and purposes of the 
PRA.  Similarly the enhanced benefits approach could be adapted to the ‘bundle of rights’ 
cases.  
 
The following are some factors which could be considered by the Court when making its 
jury assessment of the party’s controlling interest: the settlor’s intentions, the number and 
types of beneficiaries, the way in which dispositive powers have been exercised in the 
past, the relationship between the holder of the power to ‘hire and fire’ trustees with other 
trustees, the history of the management of the trust, the value of the trust fund, the 
financial circumstances of the party who has effective ‘control’ of the trust as well as the 
other party together with any dependent beneficiaries. 
 
Unfortunately, there is little or no guidance that can be found in other jurisdictions.  The 
Australian cases do not assist because the FLA enables the court to “alter the interests of 
  
300  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 15. 
301  Haldane v Haldane [1981] 1 NZLR 554 (CA). 
302  Walkinshaw v Walkinshaw (1992) 9 FRNZ 18 (HC). 
303  Z v Z (No.2) above n 299 at p 290-291. 
304  Walker above n 224 at [60] Chambers J. 
305  Z v Z (No 2) above n 299 at p 131. 
306  Haldane v Haldane above n 301. 
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the parties to the marriage in the property …”307 and the valuation of such interests is not 
as critical as it is in New Zealand PRA cases.   
 
In Canada case authorities discuss three possible methods of determining value.  The 
courts can use an “if and when” approach308 as to when the prejudiced party receives 
their share of the capital distribution by delaying it until the other party receives their 
capital or income distribution.  In one case the court took a notional pro rata distribution 
of the value of the trust fund depending upon the number of capital beneficiaries.309 The 
court can also examine the purpose of the trust to see if the other discretionary 
beneficiaries are likely to receive a distribution and if so how much.310   
 
The first and second approaches are too problematic to be applied in New Zealand.  The 
PRA does not lend itself easily to an “if and when” approach because it is inconsistent 
with the ‘clean break’ principles and purposes of the PRA.311  The pro rata approach has 
been criticised and likened to a lottery ticket312 and does not address the ‘control’ issues 
discussed above whereas the third approach is closer to the way in which the valuation 
exercise could be framed in ‘bundle of rights’ cases.  
 
In conclusion,  provided there is a full enquiry into the proper construction of the trust 
deed and assessment of the degree of ‘control’ exercised by one or both parties then it 
should be possible to adapt well established valuation methodologies to value controlling 
interests in discretionary trusts. 
 
G Enforcement – Judicious Encouragement?   
 
Having traversed the possibility that a ‘bundle of rights’ in a discretionary trust can be 
valuable property the residual question of payment still needs to be addressed. Again 
much will depend on the facts of each case.  In situations where there are mirror313 or 
  
307  Family Law Act 1975 s 79(1)(a). 
308  Da Costa v Da Costa (1992) 7 OR (3d) 321 and referred to by Shelley Griffiths “Valuation of 
interests in discretionary trusts” NZLS Relationship Property Intensive – your big (legal) day out!  
August 2010 at p 62. 
309  Sagl v Sagl (1997) 31 RFL (4th) 405 (Ont. Gen. Div). 
310  Kachur v Kachur  (2000) ABQB 709 (Alta. Q.B.). 
311  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 1M(c) and s 1N(d). 
312  “Valuation of interests in discretionary trusts” above n 308 at p 63. 
313  R v R [Occupation Order] above n 275. 
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parallel trusts the division of the trusts’ assets has largely occurred as a consequence of 
the trust structures.  In the Walker debt-back valuation cases ancillary orders could be 
used, in conjunction with the PRA’s compensation provisions314 to vary a trust to enable 
payment to the disadvantaged party.315 
 
However in those difficult cases where there is little or no property available for division 
and the trust does not generate an income316 there is no jurisdiction under the PRA for the 
court to order trustees to make a capital distribution to satisfy any judgment debt.  This 
does not mean that the judgment will be ineffective as the party who has been ordered to 
pay then has the responsibility to satisfy the judgment debt.  The court can order payment 
in one lump sum or by instalments as well as include the payment of interest with or 
without security.317 Failure to comply also exposes the defaulting party to the possibility 
of bankruptcy.  
 
Some guidance can be found in case authorities from the United Kingdom.   Their Act 318 
applies the sharing principle to all property which may include discretionary trust 
interests as a ‘financial resource’319 of a spouse. Judges often regard discretionary trusts 
as devices to hide or obscure assets and their approach tends to be robust by treating trust 
assets as available to the settlor spouse.320 Nevertheless the court has no power to make 
orders against the trustees directly but they will make an order against a beneficiary “[i]n 
the knowledge that it cannot be satisfied without recourse to trust assets.  The assumption 
is that the trustees will go to the aid of the beneficiary as they are unlikely to stand by and 
allow the beneficiary to go to prison for contempt of court or face bankruptcy 
proceedings.”321 This has been referred to as “judicious encouragement.”322 
 
In Thomas v Thomas Waite L J said: 323  
 
  
314  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 44C which is discussed in detail at chapter 5. 
315  MGS v BFM  FC Tauranga, 16th November 2006, FAM 2004-070-823 Judge Somerville. 
316  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 44C(2)(c). 
317  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 33(4). 
318  Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. 
319  At 25(2)(a). 
320  William Massey “Threats to the Integrity of Trusts on Marriage Breakdown” IFLJ 2008 (18) at p3. 
321  At p 4. 
322  For instance this principle was applied in Charman v Charman [2007] 2 FCR 217 (CA (Civ Div)) 
which involved an off-shore trust and the husband was ordered to pay the wife £48 million. 
323  Thomas v Thomas [1995] 2 FLR 668 at p 670. 
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…where a spouse enjoys access to wealth but no absolute entitlement to it (as in the 
case, for example, of a beneficiary under a discretionary trust or someone who is 
dependent on the generosity of a relative) the court will not act in direct invasion of 
the rights of, or usurp the discretion exercisable by, a third party.  Nor will it put 
upon a third party undue pressure to act in a way which will enhance the means of 
the maintaining spouse.  This does not, however mean that the court acts in total 
disregard of the potential availability of wealth from sources owned or administered 
by others.  There will be occasions when it becomes permissible for a judge 
deliberately to frame his orders in a form which affords judicious encouragement to 
third parties to provide the maintaining spouse with the means to comply with the 
court’s view of the justice of the case.  There are bound to be instances where the 
boundary between improper pressure and judicious encouragement proves to be a 
fine one and it will require attention to the particular circumstances of each case to 
see whether it has been crossed. 
 
Such an approach could be applied in New Zealand as it does not affect the integrity of 
the trust but at the same time recognises that wealth that has been accumulated during a 
qualifying relationship should be made available to a party to settle their relationship 
property obligations.  
 
The next chapter considers the PRA’s response to the disposition of relationship property 
to a discretionary trust and where the ‘bundle of rights’ principles fits within the existing 
statutory framework. 
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VI Compensation, Setting Aside Dispositions, Resettlement of Trusts and 
Other Judicial Responses to the Use of Trusts 
A Background 
 
The emergence of the ‘bundle of rights’ doctrine is largely a response to the inadequacies 
of the statutory provisions that deal with the disposition of relationship property into 
discretionary trusts.  As Peart has commented on a number of occasions there is an urgent 
need for reform324 as “the Act’s aim of achieving an equal division of the fruits of the 
partnership is severely undermined by trusts”325.  Reform may be some years away and in 
the meantime courts need to work within the statutory framework. 
 
The Court of Appeal in M v B326 emphasised that the courts do not have an “open-ended 
discretion to achieve equality in accordance with an individual Judge’s perception of 
what is fair and just” nor does it have a “generalised mandate which can avoid or obscure 
the structural framework which Parliament adopted” and whilst “… [t]he underlying 
philosophy and inspiration is always to be considered … [the] operational ambit must be 
evaluated within the particular statutory responses which Parliament has enacted.  They 
do not permit Courts to go further than Parliament was willing to legislate for.”327 
 
This chapter briefly considers the framework Parliament has provided to protect spouses 
and partners from dispositions of relationship property to trusts.328  This regime 
incorporates the following features which allow a spouse or de facto partner to:  
 
• register a notice of claim of an interest under the Land Transfer Act 1952 to prevent 
the transfer of real estate to a trust;329 
• restrain the disposition of property to a trust;330 
• apply to the court to set aside a disposition of relationship property to a trust if it 
was done to defeat a claim or right under the Act;331  
  
324  Equity and Trusts in New Zealand above n 24 at [41.2.4 (4)]. 
325  “Relationship property and trusts” above n 46 at p 23. 
326  M v B [economic disparity] 25 FRNZ 171(CA)  
327  At [32] – [34] Robertson J. 
328  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 42-44 applies to other types of disposition not just to trusts. 
329  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 42. 
330  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 43. 
331  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 44. 
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• seek compensation if there has been a disposition of relationship property to a trust 
which has the effect of defeating a claim or right under the Act.332 
 
In circumstances where a party is aware of the likelihood that property is going to be 
transferred or disposed of into a trust the PRA provides adequate protection.  However, 
once the disposition of relationship property has taken place, and the parties then separate 
or the relationship ends in death, the safeguards are often inadequate. 
 
B Setting Aside Disposition to a Trust 
 
If the disposition has taken place then s 44 enables the courts to set it aside if it is 
satisfied that:333 
 
… any disposition of property has been made, whether for value of not, by or on 
behalf of or by direction of or in the interests of any person in order to defeat the 
claim or rights of any person under this Act … 
 
A similar provision existed under the previous Act334 but the Court of Appeal in Coles v 
Coles335  held that an applicant had to prove that his or her spouse had a conscious desire 
to remove items of matrimonial property from the reach of the court.  Therefore there had 
to be some improper action designed to deprive a spouse of property rights and there was 
no distinction between the purpose of the disposition and the transferor’s intent.  The 
threshold for proving that a party intended to defeat the other party’s claim or rights was 
high and the section largely fell into disuse. 
 
Recently the Supreme Court in Regal Castings v Lightbody336 placed a broader 
interpretation on the meaning of the phrase “intent to defraud” in the context of a 
debtor/creditor relationship.  Blanchard J said:337  
 
  
332  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 44C. 
333  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 44 gives jurisdiction to the High Court, District Court and 
Family Court. 
334  Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 47. 
335  Coles v Coles (1987) 3 FRNZ 101 at p 105. 
336  Regal Castings Ltd v Lightbody [2009] 2 NZLR 433 (SCNZ) (“Regal Castings”). 
337  At [53]–[56]. 
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Whenever the circumstances are such that the debtor must have known that in 
alienating property, and thereby hindering, delaying or defeating creditors’ recourse 
to that property, he or she was exposing them to a significantly enhanced risk of not 
recovering the amounts owing to them, then the debtor must be taken to have 
intended this consequence, even if it was not actually the debtor’s wish to cause 
them loss … 
 
Subsequently, the High Court in a relationship property case applied the principles from 
Regal Castings and in Ryan v Unkovich338 French J held: 
 
Further I accept the principles enunciated in Regal Castings are sufficiently general 
to apply to s 44.  In particular, I accept that in so far as the Coles formula fails to 
distinguish between intention and motive, it is contrary to the reasoning of the 
Supreme Court and should not be followed.  Knowledge of a consequence can be 
equated with an intention to bring it about. 
 
 French J also held that the Court had jurisdiction to set aside dispositions before the Act 
came into effect on 1st February 2002 in circumstances where there is knowledge that 
consequence of defeating a relationship property claim.339  
 
Whilst these recent decisions open the door to the possibility of setting aside a disposition 
to a trust, the onus of proof remains on the applicant and the evidential threshold to prove 
knowledge of the likely consequence remains problematic for a number of reasons.  
There are many reasons why trusts are settled including estate planning, creditor 
protection, social assistance policies such as residential care subsidies as well as 
minimisation of income tax liabilities.  At the time of the disposition there may be no 
reason for a party in a qualifying relationship to consider or discuss the relationship 
property implications for the disposition of assets to a trust.  Trust advisers come from a 
diverse background and even if they are lawyers it does not necessarily mean that they 
have the requisite legal knowledge to explain the relationship property consequences. 
 
There are other factors which also limit the scope of this provision as the parties must 
have been in a qualifying relationship at the time of the disposition340 and it must be a 
  
338  Ryan v Unkovich [2010] 1 NZLR 434 at [33] (“Ryan”). 
339  At [40] and [42]. 
340  At [38] also referring to Genc v Genc (2006) 26 FRNZ 67. 
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disposition of relationship property.341  The court’s jurisdiction is further curtailed if the 
recipient receives the property or interest for value, “in good faith” and has altered his or 
her position in reliance of having an “indefeasible interest” in the property and/or it 
would be inequitable to grant relief.342  However, if a spouse or partner is a trustee then 
that person’s knowledge is imputed to the other trustees.343 
 
Even if the disposition has been made “otherwise than in good faith”344 to a third party 
for inadequate consideration, the court has a discretion to transfer “any part”345 of that 
property or direct that a sum “not exceeding the difference between the value of the 
consideration (if any) and the value of the property”346 be paid and consequently that 
does not necessarily mean that full value of the property is returned to the relationship 
property pool. 
 
C Compensation for Dispositions to a Trust 
 
 
Concerns that discretionary trusts are being used to side step the principles and purposes 
of the PRA have been around for over 23 years.  In 1988 the Labour Government 
established a Ministerial Working Group to update the then Matrimonial Property Act 
1976.  The Working Group identified discretionary trusts as a problem347 because they 
removed property from the equal sharing regime.  Their recommendation was to allow 
Courts the power to distribute capital from the trust or claw back specific assets into the 
matrimonial property pool. 
 
Parliament decided not to go down that path and instead opted for a regime whereby the 
court could either compensate a disadvantaged spouse or partner from other property and 
  
341  Equity and Trusts above n 24 at [41.2.4(1)] referring to JCW v FKW  FC Auckland, 15/3/05, 
FP 004/935/01 Judge Mather. 
342  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 44(4). 
343  Regal Castings above n 336 at [128] Tipping J.  Note this would have assisted the applicant in 
O v S (2006) 26 FRNZ 440 (FC) where the requisite knowledge was established but the claim 
failed on the basis of a lack of knowledge by the co-trustees. 
344  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 44(2)(a). 
345  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 44(2)(a). 
346  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 44(2)(b). 
347  Report of the Working Group on Matrimonial Property and Family Protection Wellington (1988) 
at 30. 
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as a last resort from trust income.348 The Government Administration Committee 
explained the reason as follows:349 
 
This acknowledges that trusts are created for legitimate reasons and should be 
permitted to fulfil that purpose, where there was no intention to defeat the spouse’s 
claim at the time the trust was established.  Bona fide third party interests are 
protected. 
 
To qualify for compensation a spouse or partner’s claim must meet the following criteria: 
 
(a) There must be a qualifying disposition.  Although the term ‘disposition’ is not 
defined in the Act it has been held to cover any form of alienation of a legal or 
equitable interest in property whether for value or not.350  However, rental 
payments for the use of a home are not dispositions within the meaning of s 44C.351 
 
(b) The disposition must be to an inter vivos trust and not one established by a will or 
other testamentary disposition.352 
 
(c) There must be a disposition must be of relationship property.  Consequently, if at 
the date of disposition the trust acquires an asset by borrowing from one spouse’s 
separate property then there has been no disposition of relationship property.  The 
subsequent use of the property as a family home does not convert the disposition to 
relationship property.353  Consequently, the classification takes place at the date of 
disposition. 
 




348  Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 44C. 
349  Government Administration Committee Report on Matrimonial Property Amendment Bill 1998, 
109-2 at xii. 
350  Re Polkinghorne Trust [1988] 4 NZFLR 756. 
351  Kidd van den Brink HC Auckland, 1/7/08, CIV-2007-404-6948 Stevens J. 
352  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 44A. 
353  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 44C(1)(a) and P v B [Relationship Property] [2009] NZFLR 
773 (HC). 
354  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 44C(1)(a). 
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(e) The disposition must be made by either or both spouses or partners355.  Therefore 
neither dispositions by third parties nor if the trust acquires property directly from a 
third party qualify.356 
 
(f) The disposition must be one that has the effect of defeating the claim or rights of 
one of the spouses or partners.357  Consequently, if both parties are equally affected 
by the disposition then neither can invoke s 44C.358 
 
(g) The relevant date for assessing the effect of the disposition is generally the date of 
hearing.  The Court of Appeal in Nation v Nation359 said:360 
 
As to the date at which the effect of the disposition is to be assessed, in our 
view that should be as at the date of hearing.  That is the general rule as to the 
date at which the value of property is to be determined under s 2G of the PRA.  
It is true that the Court has a discretion to determine the value at another date.  
However there appear to us to be no discretionary factors which, in this 
instance, would militate against the application of the usual rule. 
 
Finally, the disposition cannot be one which is caught by s 44361 of the Act. 
 
The cases have considered a variety of dispositions by a spouse or partner to a trust 
including: the sale of trustees of the family home, a rental property, a farm, company 
shares, the payment of mortgage instalments and the forgiveness of debts back.  Similarly 
if relationship income has been used to pay a mortgage on a trust property or if 
relationship property has been used as security for a loan taken out by the trust362 they 
will qualify as dispositions which trigger the discretion to grant compensation.   
 
If a party has a qualifying claim for compensation then the court has a discretion to order 
compensation out of relationship or separate property363.  If neither of these sources are 
  
355  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 44C(1)(a). 
356  Genc v Genc [2006] NZFLR 1119. 
357  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 44C(1)(b). 
358  P v P [2005] NZFLR 689 at [96]. 
359  Nation v Nation [2005] 3 NZLR 46. 
360  At [150]. 
361  See discussion above at page 79 – 81 above. 
362  Equity and Trusts above n 24 at [41.2.4(2)(a)]. 
363  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 44C(2)(a) 
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sufficient to meet the quantum of compensation then the court may require the trustees to 
pay trust income either for a specified period of time or until the specified amount has 
been paid.364 However, the court cannot require the trustees to pay trust income in 
circumstances where a third person in “good faith” has altered his or her position and is 
relying upon receipt of the trust’s income.365  
 
The court in exercising its discretion to award compensation has to consider the value of 
relationship property disposed of to the trust, the value of relationship property available 
for division, the date when relationship property was disposed of to the trust, whether the 
trust gave consideration for the property, the other beneficiaries of the trust and any other 
relevant matter.366  
 
In IRM v SJB367 the Court applied a formula where the current value of the property was 
taken and from that sum there were deductions for debts incurred in the acquisition of the 
trust property, the nett balance was then divided in half and that sum was to be paid to 
Mr M out of the relationship debt owed by the trust to Ms B. 
 
Whilst the courts can require trustees to pay income to the dispossessed party, many 
family trusts produce no income as the trust fund comprises the ownership of assets such 
as the family home.  Although the courts do have an ancillary power to vary the terms of 
a trust368 it can only do so when making a substantive order under the Act.369  
Consequently, if there is no property and the trust cannot generate income then there is 
nothing the court can do to vary the terms of the trust.   
 
However, if the court can order compensation then s 33(3)(m) could be used to change 
the vesting date370, direct trustees to sell trust property and repay a debt to the spouse or 
partner371, or appoint the dispossessed party as a beneficiary of the trust, or restrict or 
suspend the respondent’s entitlement to benefit under the trust. 
 
  
364  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 44C(2)(c). 
365  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 44C(3). 
366  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 44C(4). 
367  IRM v SJB  FC, Wellington, 24 March 2010, FAM-2007-085-10  subsequently upheld on appeal 
SJB v IRM HC Wellington, 4 November 2010, CIV 2010-485-710, Simon France J. 
368  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 33(3)(m). 
369  Equity and Trusts above n 24 at [41.2.4(3)]. 
370  PGD v IGD FC Wellington, 2/8/05, FAM-2000-085-2601, Judge V Ullrich QC. 
371  MGS v BFM FC Tauranga, 16/11/06, FAM-2004-070-823, Judge Somerville. 
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For the reasons already discussed s 44C is ineffective where there is an insufficient pool 
of relationship or separate property.  This situation is likely to be exacerbated when gift 
duty is abolished in October 2011 when spouses or partners can gift the entire debt-back 
to the trust372 as that will further diminish the pool of property available for division. 
 
D Section 182 Family Proceedings Act 1980  
 
In a different statutory setting and isolated from the relationship property regime a 
disadvantaged spouse or civil union partner can apply to the court for orders to vary the 
terms of ante-nuptial and post-nuptial settlements373 when, or shortly after, the 
dissolution of a marriage or civil union.  However, the remedy is not available to de facto 
partners. 
 
Further this is not a general remedy to be used with reference to concepts of “fairness and 
justice,”374 nor is the discretion based on the principles of equal sharing under the Act375 
or a “surrogate mechanism for dividing what, but for the trust, would have been 
relationship property.”376  The Court of Appeal has stated that s 182 is not a “trust busting 
route”377 into the PRA. 
 
Recently the Supreme Court considered the way in which the jurisdiction under s 182 
should be exercised and in Ward v Ward held:378 
 
Based on the foregoing discussion we consider the proper way to address whether an 
order should be made under s 182 is to identify all relevant expectations which the 
parties, and in particular the applicant party, had of the settlement at the time it was 
made.  Those expectations which the parties, and in particular the applicant party, 
have of the settlement in the changed circumstances brought about by the 
dissolution.  The court’s task is to assess how best in the changed circumstances the 
reasonable expectations the applicant had of the settlement should now be fulfilled.  
  
372  See the discussion at Chapter 5 paragraph D. 
373  Family Proceedings Act 1980 s 182. 
374  W v W [2009] 3 NZLR 336 at [49] (CA). 
375  Fisher on Matrimonial and Relationship Property, Loose-leaf, para [6.14]. 
376  Ward v Ward [2009] 2 NZLR 31 (SCNZ) at [49]. 
377   X v X [2009] NZFLR 956 at [44]–[45]. 
378  Ward v Ward above n 376 at [25]. 
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If the dissolution has not affected the implementation of the applicant’s previous 
expectations, there will be no call for an order. 
 
Further s 182(3) provides that the comparison of changes in circumstances needs to be 
made at the time of the settlement and at the time of dissolution of the marriage or civil 
union. 
 
Whilst the position with post-nuptial settlements presupposes an entitlement to apply for 
a variation of the trust, the position with ante-nuptial settlements is different.  In Kidd v 
van den Brink379 the High Court held that there had to be a “degree of connection or 
proximity between the settlement (not the settled property) and the particular 
marriage”380 and that nuptial character will not exist if the future spouse is only one of a 
class of possible beneficiaries.  The applicant then sought leave to appeal to the Court of 
Appeal381 and whilst leave was granted on other grounds William Young P said that 
leave would not be granted on the ante-nuptial settlement argument because the Supreme 
Court in Ward v Ward 382 applied s 182 in line with established English authority that a 
nuptial settlement requires a particular marriage in mind.   
 
The ground that the Court of Appeal did grant leave was whether “dispositions to the 
trust made during the currency of the marriage engage s 182 as post-nuptial 
settlements.”383   The Court of Appeal then indicated that it may follow the reasoning of 
Kiefel J in Kennon v Spry384 that:385 
 
There appears to be no reason why each disposition of property to the trust, from the 
time of the parties’ marriage, cannot be viewed as a separate trust created at that 
time, albeit on the terms of the trust.  
 
  
379  Kidd v ven den Brink & Anor HC Auckland, 21 December 2009, CIV Harrison and 
Winkelmann JJ. 
380  At [18]. 
381  Kidd v ven den Brink [2010] NZCA 169 (CA). 
382  Ward v Ward above n 376. 
383  Kidd v ven den Brink above n 381 at [10]. 
384  Kennon v Spry (2008) 251 ALR 257 (HCA). 
385  At [209] Kiefel J. 
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However, the case has now settled386 and this is an issue, of considerable significance, 
which will need to be considered by the Court of Appeal on another occasion because on 
current High Court authority the ‘multi trust’ theory has been rejected. 
 
E Judicial Responses in Other Cases 
 
In cases which do not engage either the PRA or the Family Proceedings Act, the courts 
have considered discretionary trusts where a party has effective ‘control’ of the 
administration and disposition of trust assets.  The validity of these trusts has been 
challenged on the basis that the trust is a sham or the alter ego of the settlor.  The concept 
of alter ego trusts has also been applied in some constructive trust cases.  All of these 
judicial responses require examination. 
 
1 Shams and alter ego trusts 
 
Whether trust assets are within the grasp of the court’s jurisdiction has been the subject of 
intense scrutiny not only in family law but also by creditors.  There have been lively 
debates about the possibility that many discretionary trusts with wide dispositive powers 
should be declared invalid as being a sham.387 The Australian concept of the alter ego 
trust has been pulled into the debate as a means of disregarding the trust388 or as part of 
the grounds to establish a constructive trust. 
 
However, the Court of Appeal in Official Assignee v Wilson & Anor389 largely 
extinguished these possibilities when it found that a trust ‘controlled’ by a person who 
was neither a trustee nor beneficiary was not a sham.  The court adopted the traditional 
view390 that both settlor and trustees have to have a common intention, at the time of 
inception, not to create the legal rights and obligations of a trust relationship.  This 
creates a very high evidential threshold for a third party claimant.  The Court of Appeal 
also rejected the concept of an ‘emerging sham’ on the basis that once a valid trust was 
  
386  Law Commission Issues Paper above n 3 at [3.37]. 
387  Begum v Ali FC Auckland, 10/12/04, FP004/128/00 Judge O’Donovan and was upheld on appeal 
in A v B HC Auckland, 1/6/05,  CIV-2005-404-496 Rodney Hansen J. 
388  C v C (No 2) [2006] NZFLR 908 (FC). 
389  Official Assignee v Wilson & Anor [2008] 3 NZLR 45 (CA) (“Wilson’s case”). 
390  Snook v London & West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 1 All ER 518 at 528. 
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created it could not be undone “unless the later appearance of a sham can be traced back 
to the creation of the trust, the trust remains valid.”391  
 
Correspondingly the enthusiasm for the development of an alternative cause of action 
being the alter ego trust was dampened in Wilson’s case when the Court of Appeal held 
that it was not an alternative doctrine that could be applied to ‘bust’ trusts.  Robertson and 
O’Regan JJ rejected the concept by concluding:392   
  
[t]he assumption of factual control by someone other than a trustee … or by 
someone without legal right to exercise such power cannot of itself invalidate a trust 
… Actual control alone .. cannot be sufficient to extinguish the rights of the 
beneficiaries … 
 
Yet, the position with alter ego trusts in relationship property cases remains unclear 
because Glazebrook J393 left open the possibility that an alter ego trust which is not a 
sham  
  
…can be treated as the property of the individual involved for the purposes, for 
example, of a relationship property division. 
 
And then went on to say:394 
 
I agree that the trust could not be looked through and that the trust assets themselves 
would not be available for division.  It may be, however, that the trust property could 
nevertheless be treated as an asset of the individual involved and the other party 
awarded a larger share of the other available assets.  Whether this approach is 
contrary to the legislative intent as manifested in the Property (Relationships) Act 
1976, as suggested by Peart … would, however need to be considered.  Section 182 
of the Family Proceedings Act 1980 may also be relevant.   
 
This is an indication from the Court of Appeal that some interests in discretionary trusts 
may be given property status in proceedings under the PRA.  As the development of the 
principles of alter ego trusts in family law largely originates from Australia, the courts 
  
391  Wilson’s case above n 387 at [57]. 
392  At [69]–[70] Robertson and O’Regan JJ. 
393  At [128] Glazebrook J. 
394  At [129]. 
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are likely to derive assistance from the Australian cases culminating in Spry.395  It is also 
an indication that the courts are increasingly looking at an expansive meaning of property 
which runs across orthodox trust principles.  That does not mean the trust would collapse 
because the courts do not have access to the trust capital but they would still be able to 
order the ‘controller’ to pay a sum to satisfy the disadvantaged spouse or partner’s 
relationship property claims.  
 
The concept of alter ego trusts will not be available as a general cause of action in other 
jurisdictions such as claims by third party creditors and this is a further indication that the 
meaning of property under the PRA is being developed in a way that marks the special 
nature of this social legislation. 
 
Under the PRA concepts such as alter ego trusts and the doctrine of the ‘bundle of rights’ 
then become almost interchangeable because both rest on the principle that property 
interests can be declared to exist in those discretionary trusts which are effectively 
‘controlled’ by a spouse or partner.  The courts can take into consideration wealth that 
has been generated during the relationship, exclude wealth from third party or pre-
relationship sources and fashion orders that are capable of enforcement or at least provide 
‘judicious encouragement’ to trustees to comply with the courts view of the justice of the 
case.396  
 
2 Constructive trust claims 
 
This discussion would not be complete without briefly considering the position of a de 
facto partner at the end of the relationship when the PRA does not apply.397  This group 
of claimants cannot seek a variation of the trust under s 182 as there are no nuptial 
settlements.398   
 
Prior to Wilson’s case the High Court adapted the alter ego trust principle in constructive 
trust claims.  The constructive trust is imposed upon property owned by an express trust 
on the principles of Lankow v Rose.399 An applicant needs to show direct or indirect 
  
395  Kennon v Spry above n 162. 
396  See chapter 5 – valuation of interests in discretionary trusts and enforcement at pages 72-77. 
397  Either because the de facto relationship ended before 1st February 2002, or there were no 
dispositions of property which could fall with s 44 and  s 44C. 
398  See pages 85-86 above and the discussion on variation and resettlement of trusts. 
399  Lankow v Rose [1995] 1 NZLR 277 (CA) and adopting the approach of Tipping J at 294. 
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contributions to the property in question, a reasonable expectation of an interest in the 
property and the defendants should then reasonably yield the claimant an interest in that 
property. The alter ego principles are then applied to the parties’ reasonable expectations 
of the applicant’s interest in the trust assets.  In Prime v Hardie400 Salmon J explained the 
position in this way:401 
 
I accept that the plaintiff did have an expectation of an interest in the family home 
and, that despite the fact that it is owned by a trust, that expectation was a reasonable 
one.  It was reasonable because the home was treated as though it was owned by the 
first defendant … I consider the trust can reasonably expect to yield the claimant an 
interest in the family home. 
 
In that case the de facto partner did have an interest in the family home but not the rental 
properties.402  In Glass v Hughey403 a de facto partner established a constructive trust 
against business assets owned by a trust but on the basis that she had made contributions 
both direct and indirect to the business.  Priestley J found that the husband retained 
effective control over the trust’s shareholding in the company and held that:404  
 
[t]he trust for all intents and purposes [has] been disregarded by the husband so far 
as his operation of International is concerned and, so far as the wife’s claim is 
concerned should be regarded as a sham or more particularly the husband’s alter ego. 
 
Since Wilson’s case the concept of an alter ego in a potential constructive trust claim was 
raised in F v W405 when Gendall J dismissed the possibility of a sham but said that “the 
trust was the alter ego of Mr F.”406 Consequently Gendall J held that if the disadvantaged 
partner cannot establish that certain items are relationship property then a constructive 
trust claims based on the approach in Prime v Hardie407 or O v S408is still available.  
 
  
400  Prime v Hardie [2003] NZFLR 481 (HC) Salmon J. 
401  At [33]. 
402  At [34]. 
403  Glass v Hughey [2003] NZFLR 865 (HC) Priestley J. 
404  At [89]. 
405  F v W 3 August 2009, HC Wellington, 3 August 2009, CIV-2009-485-531, Gendall J. 
406  At [37]. 
407  Prime v Hardie above n 400. 
408  O v S (2006) 26 FRNZ 440 (FC) Judge O’Dwyer. 
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VII Evaluation and Criticisms of the ‘Bundle of Rights’ Theory 
 
For reasons discussed in chapters 4 and 5 the doctrinal basis for concepts such as alter 
ego trusts and more recently the ‘bundle of rights’ remains highly controversial on both 
sides of the Tasman.   
 
Whilst the High Court of Australia has settled on an expansive meaning of property under 
the FLA it has been at the expense of settled principles in trust and fiduciary law.  The 
outcome of decisions such as Spry409 has been to declare discretionary trusts ineffective 
against third party spousal claims in circumstances where the trustee’s power of selection 
is controlled either by a spouse who is a beneficiary or an appointor.   The entire trust 
fund can then be declared to be the property of the spouse.  It would be trite to say that 
there is considerable disquiet as to whether discretionary trusts can or should be looked 
through in this way. 
 
In New Zealand, the debate is more recent and also sits in a different family property and 
statutory regime.   The 2001 amendments to the PRA do not allow the courts to walk 
through trusts and re-distribute its assets to a disadvantaged spouse or partner.  The 
Supreme Court410 also confirmed the view that Parliament’s purpose is to protect trust 
capital over relationship property rights.  
 
Although it may appear a fine line, it is the writer’s view that the way the Court of 
Appeal applied the concept of a ‘bundle of rights’ to the valuation of a debt owed to the 
parties in Walker411 did no damage to the integrity of the trust.  Instead, it built on the 
valuation principles in Z v Z (No 2) but in a different context.  Similarly the occupation 







409  Kennon v Spry above n 162. 
410  Ward v Ward above n 376 but this case involved an interpretation of s 182 Family Proceedings 
Act 1980. 
411  Walker v Walker above n 225.  
412  R v R above n 275 and M v M above n 290. 
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A Lack of Jurisprudential Debate and Explanation 
 
In New Zealand a major criticism of the concept of a ‘bundle of rights’ is that it has 
emerged with a “lack of jurisprudential debate and explanation.”413 Undoubtedly such 
criticisms are justified because the term was first discussed by the Court of Appeal in 
1997 in the context of the valuation of a spouse’s interest in a law partnership414 but it 
was no until 2006415 that the concept arose in the context of trusts and then applied by the 
Court of Appeal in 2007416 but with limited explanation. 
 
No statutory guidance has been given to explain how and why the definition of property 
under the Act had been expanded to include these ‘rights’ as property.  No explanation 
has been given as to why the law of powers and fiduciary obligations appear to have been 
disregarded.  Further, there appears to be no other overseas jurisdiction which has relied 
upon a concept of a ‘bundle of rights’ in this context.  The closest analogy that can be 
made is to the Australian alter ego principles which have developed since the early 1980s 
but only after considerable debate and full arguments before their highest courts.   
 
There is also confusion as to the boundaries of the ‘bundle of rights’ principles 
particularly in light of the Court of Appeal’s reiteration of the long held view that 
discretionary beneficiaries have no right to any trust property until an appointment of 
property is made in their favour.417 In practical terms the ‘bundle of rights’ doctrine 
appears to carve out an exception to the general rule but the line between a mere hope or 
expectancy and a property interest is uncertain.  
 
Recently the Law Commission commented418 that the Walker decision is unclear as to 
what is the property in question.  Is it the trustee/spouse’s rights as a director, 
shareholder, power to “hire and fire” trustees and directors as well as the parties’ 
discretionary interests considered on an individual basis?  Or is it the ‘combined 
package” of all these rights and interests?  Or is it the ‘control’ that the accumulation of 
the assets gives that is the relevant property?  It is the writer’s view that the Court of 
  
413  Anthony Grant “Cradle to Grave: The interface between property and family law” 2010 
www.anthony.grant.com. 
414  Z v Z (No.2) above n 300. 
415  M v B [2006] 3 NZLR 660 at 112, Robertson J. 
416  Walker v Walker above n 225. 
417  Gartside v Inland Revenue Commissioners above n 221, Hunt v Muollo above n 201 and Nation v 
Nation above n 204. 
418  Law Commission Issues paper above n 3 at [4.39]. 
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Appeal focussed on the ‘control’ that arises with the “package” of rights and interests but 
it is accepted that this is only one interpretation. 
 
Another issue is whether the ‘bundle of rights’ cases are only applicable in a valuation 
exercise under the PRA419 or does the principle apply generally in relationship property 
cases?  With the likely abolition of gift duty in October 2011 this could be crucial 
because debt-backs may be forgiven at the time of settlement of the trust and for existing 
trusts within 24 hours of gift duty being abolished!  If there are no debts to value then the 
utility of this line of case authority may be lost in applications to determine the extent of 
property available for division.420   If the ‘bundle of rights’ doctrine operates 
independently to a valuation of a debt then there could be wide ranging possibilities as to 
its application in family law. 
 
There is also the difficult issue of valuation of a spouse or partner’s ‘bundle of rights.’    
On one view once the element of ‘control’ has been established then the court could take 
the value of the trust fund as the property to be divided.421 If that approach was 
inappropriate then the court could consider the factors discussed in chapter 5 and adapt a 
methodology for valuing the ‘controller’s’ interest in the trust fund by drawing on the 
contingent valuation methods in partnership and superannuation cases.422 
 
Before, during or after the valuation stage the courts will need to develop principles 
surrounding the disposition of assets into the trust from mixed sources such as inheritance 
or pre-relationship property.  For instance, the courts may adopt the view of Kiefel J in 
Spry423 that each disposition of property to the trust creates a separate trust but on the 
terms of the original trust deed.  The ‘multi-trust’ approach would also give the courts 
flexibility to differentiate between separate and relationship property.  
 
All of these important questions need to be answered if the doctrine of the ‘bundle of 
rights’ is to be understood and consistently applied in the context of relationship property 
claims.  At the moment uncertainty fuels speculation that the doctrine is unprincipled and 
is a form of law by ‘abracadabra’ and consequently should not be respected.  Yet it is the 
writer’s view that the principles are perfectly well grounded and draw upon a vast body 
  
419  See the comments made in chapter 5 at pages 72-75. 
420  The ‘bundle of rights’ principles could still be applied in the occupation order line of authority. 
421  This was the outcome of Walker v Walker. 
422  Z v Z (No 2) above n 300 and Haldane v Haldane above n 301. 
423  Kennon v Spry above n 162 at [209]. 
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of Australian case law that has slowly developed the meaning of family property in the 
context of discretionary trusts.  
 
B ‘Effective’ Control of Discretionary Trusts 
 
In New Zealand the problem of ‘settlor control’ and the increasing tendency to create 
alter ego or settlor responsive trusts is well known but at least for the last ten years the 
judicial response, under the PRA, has been muddled as practitioners and judges try to 
mould solutions out of concepts such as ‘shams’ which has its origins in commercial 
contract law or attempting to establish the alter ego trust as a separate cause of action 
available in all trust/third party claim cases or bending the boundaries around the 
provisions to vary or resettle trust assets424 by injecting concepts such as equal sharing.  
 
Even practitioners who remain critical of the concept of a ‘bundle of rights’ have raised 
concerns that the modern discretionary trust often gives the possessor of powers effective 
control over the trusts’ assets and therefore the ‘bundle of rights’ concept “… may be 
another way of explaining that many family trusts are ‘insincere’ and in effect the settlor 
or possessor of powers has effective control over the trust’s assets and can do with them 
as he or she likes.  Where this is correct, the doctrine deserves respect.” 425 
 
Alternatively, some commentators have expressed concern that judges are being 
persuaded by family lawyers to ‘underplay or to acquiesce’426 to notions of effective 
control by disregarding trust principles.  That courts should disregard submissions on 
‘settlor’ control rendering a trust ineffective and one commentator suggested that “[i]t is 
misconduct for counsel to mount a baseless argument.”427 There is no doubt that debate is 
heated because the doctrine of the ‘bundle of rights’ raises immensely important issues 
between the interface of family and trust law.   
 
  
424  Family Proceedings Act, 1980 s 182. 
425  Anthony Grant “The Bundle of Rights doctrine:  Is it good law? (Part 2)” NZ Lawyer 11 
December 2009 p 13. 
426  J Palmer and S Weil “Beneficiaries rights – the more you get the less you have?” (paper presented 
to the New Zealand Law Society Trusts Conference, 2009). 
427  T Molloy QC “Still more on settler control: the 18th September 2008 reserved decision of New 
Zealand High Court in Harrison v Harrison CIV2008-404-001270” Trusts & Trustees Vol 16, No 
2, 2 March 2010. 
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The problems associated with ‘control’ are seeping into cases in all jurisdictions. For 
instance in Isolare Investments v Fetherston428 Williams J voiced concerns when he 
said429: 
 
As mentioned, Mr Langdon said that his and other practitioners, commonplace form 
of discretionary family trusts now gives trustees very much greater control over trust 
assets than hitherto.  At least as far as the Fetherston Family Trust is concerned, the 
form of the deed may well be seen as raising the expectations of discretionary 
beneficiaries, particularly when there is identity between the primary beneficiaries 
and trustees.  Whether, following detailed scrutiny of such changes, the traditional 
view of beneficiaries’ lack of interest in discretionary trust assets will survive 
remains to be seen.  It was not in issue in Johns or Hunt.  
 
In RWR v AJR,430 a relationship property case, Andrews J rejected a submission, based on 
orthodox trust principles, that the husband was no better off than his wife as a 
discretionary beneficiary because:431 
 
 … the trust deed gave RWR, as settlor, the power to appoint a new trustee.  The 
trustee appointed by him was a company of which he is the sole director and sole 
shareholder.  The combined effect of those two facts is that RWR has control over 
the trust. 
 
In Australia and other common law jurisdictions there have been judicial concerns that 
trusts which are under the effective ‘control’ of an appointor are not trusts at all.432  
Although these cases arise in different statutory settings the point remains the same that 
when the evidence establishes that a settlor and/or an appointor treats the assets in the 
trust as their own then there is a strong argument that trust property may be included in 
the property of the ‘controller’.  
 
There are three aspects of control which need to be considered in the interface between 
family and trust law.  Namely, whether the laws of powers and fiduciary obligations 
  
428  Isolare Investments Ltd v Fetherston HC Auckland, 15/9/06, CIV 2002-404-1791,Williams J. 
429  At [51]. 
430  RWR v AJR [Trusts] [2010] NZFLR 82. 
431  At [31]. 
432  A Grant and  N Peart  “The case for the Spouse or Partner” (a paper presented to the New Zealand 
Law Society Trusts Conference, June 2009) at 139 and the cases referred to including Rahman v 
Chase Trust Company (CI) Ltd & Ors, Re Stephen Moor (1991) JLR 103, In the Marriage of 
Ashton .. In the Marriage of Stein … In the Marriage of Goodwin … 
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regulate these types of discretionary trusts?  Whether these trusts offend the principle of 
certainty of intention to create a trust and therefore are not trusts at all?  How to ascertain 
this characteristic of ‘control’?  All these issues are inter-linked so it is necessary to go 
back to basics and consider the core values that protect the trust from third party claims. 
  
As discussed in chapter 3 the essential characteristic of a trust rests on the fiduciary 
relationship between trustee and beneficiary and the rules that regulate the trustee’s duty 
to perform the trusts honestly and in good faith.433   As Waters explains:434 
 
.. it is also common knowledge that historically Equity courts aimed to enforce the 
subjective intention of the creator of the express trust.  Intent was the foremost 
judicial concern … Trust law therefore become for the most part – and remains so – 
an assembly of rules that operate in the absence of intention.  It is because this is so 
that we have the present problem.  Default rules suggest to some that there are no 
limits to otherwise desired express powers.  And into the bargain what are the few 
mandatory rules in trust law is itself arguable.  
  
The common law does permit settlors to reserve certain rights and powers435 but the 
problem lies in the boundaries between what is or is not permissible.  The modern 
New Zealand discretionary family trust often provides that the settlor has the power to 
‘hire and fire’436 trustees and appoint the settlor as a trustee.  This can be done without 
the need to give reasons and is a powerful way of controlling or at least influencing the 
trustees in making their decisions.  As Waters says there is a perception that discretionary 
trusts are a more settlor responsive device and consequently437: 
 
My concern is the ambiguity that these powers create in their lessening of the 
fiduciary obligation of the trustee towards the beneficiary, and of a meaningful 
beneficiary right to a trustee accounting.   
  
Nevertheless the author concludes that:438  
 
  
433  Armitage v Nurse [1998] Ch 241 at 253-4. 
434  Donovan Waters QC “Settlor control – what kind of a problem is it?” Trusts & Trustees, Vol 15, 1 
March 2009 at p 12 [“Settlor control”]. 
435  “Settlor control” at p 13 and also referring to The 1985 Hague Trusts Convention, Article 2. 
436  At p 13. 
437  At p 14. 
438  At p 16. 
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Sham appears to be the only effective way in which to respond to settlor or third 
party trust control.  But when that cannot be argued, because the instrument confers 
settlor or third party powers without a trace of settlor dissembling in so doing, trust 
law is content with fairly general statements about the possible fiduciary nature of 
the power conferred. 
 
That neatly encapsulates the tension between trust and family law.  As a consequence of 
Wilson’s case a party has a very high threshold to satisfy before a trust could be declared 
a sham and effective ‘control’ is not a ground to invalidate a trust. 
 
Most of the criticisms439 around using terminology such as effective ‘control’ of 
discretionary trusts are that it obfuscates the central tenet that trustees are accountable to 
their beneficiaries and therefore cannot have ‘control’ of the trust.  If the trustee or 
appointee breaches their fiduciary obligations the appropriate remedy is to challenge the 
validity of the disposition as fraud on a power.  This is the reason that equity has 
developed stringent rules restraining the self-interest of trustees and keeps them within 
the ambit of their power.  However, this becomes a circular argument because a trust that 
is effectively ‘controlled’ is likely to be one where a fiduciary has wide powers to benefit 
themselves as well as deny others such as an estranged partner or spouse.  Obligations 
owed to other discretionary beneficiaries are eroded as the trust deed may permit the 
distribution of the entire trust fund to the ‘controller’.  
 
In a family property claim, orthodox accountability depends upon a disadvantaged spouse 
or partner asking the court to intervene to enforce the trustees’ fiduciary obligations when 
or if the ‘controlling’ party has misused their trustee office.  It presumes that the 
disadvantaged party will have ongoing access to knowledge surrounding the 
administration of the trust and the disposition of its assets, after the qualifying 
relationship has ended.  This is extremely unlikely. 
 
It also offends other relationship property principles that recognise the importance that 
when relationships end and property questions arise under the PRA they should be dealt 
with inexpensively, simply and speedily as is consistent with justice.440  This is a further 
reason why reliance on fiduciary obligations, as a means of protecting the purity of the 
  
439  W M Patterson “Fog, Resettlements and Fraud on a Power” (paper presented to the New Zealand 
Law Society Trusts Conference, 2009), A Grant “Effective control sand sham trusts” NZ Lawyer 
(7 August 2009). 
440  Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 1N(c). 
98 Relationship Property and Trusts: The “Bundle of Rights” Theory  
 
 
trust structure, is unrealistic. It also illustrates that there are different policy reasons to 
support an expansive meaning of property under the PRA as opposed to other statutes.  
 
Whilst it is possible for a discretionary beneficiary to have access to the Trust Deed and 
some financial information it is only possible as part of the court’s inherent supervisory 
jurisdiction over trusts441 or as a consequence of an application for relationship property 
orders.442  In the former a discretionary beneficiary may struggle to persuade the court to 
grant access.443  
 
In many cases the court may have no difficulty in concluding that an applicant with 
no more than a theoretical possibility of benefit ought not to be granted relief. 
 
Where there are allegations of breach of trust or fiduciary obligations then it has been 
pointed out that:444 
 
 … in situations where the trustee has not observed his core obligations and has 
indeed acted dishonestly or capriciously, his decision is a breach of trust for which 
remedies can lie against him.  Yet it is near impossible to prove such a breach 
without accessing the trustee’s reasons and trustees are unlikely to accede freely to 
requests for access for such reasons. 
 
A disadvantaged spouse or partner can apply to the Family Court for disclosure of the 
Trust Deed and some other documents but that provision is also restricted because it only 
applies to dispositions of relationship property to a trust and the type of information 
necessary to establish a party has acted dishonestly or capriciously is completely different 
and is supervised by the High Court.  Consequently, the inability to access trustees’ 
resolutions is a further impediment on holding a reluctant party to account. 
 
As discussed in chapter 3 whilst a breach of trust can be sanctioned by the court and the 
trustee can be held responsible445 the threshold required to establish a fraud on a power is 
  
441  Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd [2003] 2 AC 709; adopted in New Zealand in Foreman v Kingstone 
[2004] 1 NZLR 841. 
442  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 44B. 
443  J Palmer & S Weil “Beneficiaries rights – the more you get the less you have?” (a paper presented 
to the NZLS/CLE Trusts Conference 2009) at p 88 quoting from Lord Walker in Schmidt v 
Rosewood Trust Ltd at [67] above n 439. 
444  At p 89. 
445  At 89 referring to Wong v Burt [2005] 1 NZLR 91 (CA). 
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not straight forward particularly in situations where there is a mixed purpose and there is 
evidence of ‘appointor control.’  
 
As Grant and Peart446 have explained the Supreme Court in Kain v Hutton447 appear to 
sanction ‘appointor control’ when Blanchard J said that the settlor had “complete ongoing 
control of the trust” and that control gave her - “ … the ability to take the benefit herself 
or, if she saw fit, to pass all or some of it to her daughters or other family members.”   In 
these circumstances a disadvantaged spouse or partner will have difficulty, on orthodox 
principles, in establishing a fraud on a power.  Post separation a disadvantaged party may 
find the wealth that has accumulated during their relationship is re-settled on to a trust in 
which not only they are not a beneficiary but also includes new beneficiaries. 
  
Without repeating the discussion in chapter 3, it can be seen that the shield provided to 
trusts, by the laws on powers and fiduciary obligations, is seriously eroded where a party 
has effective ‘control.’   If accountability in these types of discretionary trusts is illusory 
then that devalues the power of the right of trust law to claim the orthodox view is 
immune from other competing claims.  An expansive meaning of property under the PRA 
acknowledges society’s expectation that wealth created during a qualifying relationship 
should be available for division between the parties of that relationship.  These values are 
more important and are likely to give ‘trumping’ power to property claims in family law 
over trust orthodoxy.   
 
This line of reasoning does not apply to general third party claimants because the core 
values claimed by discretionary trusts are different to the competing interests of third 
parties such as creditors.  In these circumstances, traditional property rights protect the 
discretionary trust and have presumptive power over other third party claimants.  
 
C Certainty of Intention 
 
Maybe the real issue with ‘control’ rests on whether these trust structures fall foul of the 
elementary proposition that a valid trust in equity requires certainty of intention to 
separate legal and beneficial ownership from the property in question.  As Palmer and 
Weil observe:448 
  
446  “The case for the spouse or partner” above n 432 at p 138. 
447  Kain v Hutton above n 64 and see chapter 3 above and discussion on Fraud on a Power. 
448  “Beneficiaries rights – the more you get the less you have?” above n 443 at page 80.  




The legal owner of the property cannot then act in relation to the property for his 
own or for a third party’s benefit, but rather only for the benefit of the beneficiaries 
in whom equitable title to the property rests.  
 
The Law Commission also suggests449 that the courts could focus on this analysis and 
invalidate trusts where the settlor “continued to exercise personal dominion over the so-
called trust property.”450  Certainly this could be an avenue for the courts to consider but 
like the ‘sham’ cases they will depend on their own facts and there will be difficulties in 
establishing a lack of intention.  At present there appear to be no case authorities in New 
Zealand and for that reason it is difficult to evaluate in the context of family law.  
However, it is the writer’s view that this line of reasoning is on all fours with the 
Australian alter ego principles that beneficiary control creates ‘effective’ or ‘de facto’ 
ownership of the trust’s assets and ‘effective’ ownership is a form of beneficial 
ownership. 
 
D ‘Control’ – The Reality Test?  
 
The proposition that a party can ‘control’ a discretionary trust also exposes the different 
perspectives taken in trust and family law. 
 
In trust law the presumption that an appointor will exercise a power in good faith and for 
the end designed is the starting point.  Wide dispositive powers in a trust deed cannot 
point to a situation of ‘control’ unless or until there is specific evidence that trustees have 
succumbed to the controller without considering their fiduciary duties.  In the absence of 
such proof courts should not assume the necessary level of ‘control’ exists.   
 
However in family law, courts are often faced with wide ranging enquiries to discover the 
extent of relationship property as well as understand the parties’ present and future 
circumstances.  The perspective taken by family law is to look at the reality of the parties’ 
circumstances and courts are more inclined to view the trust deed in light of its likely use.  
Australian case authority developed from the presumption that social reality was the 
touchstone and not the presumptions afforded by equity. 
 
  
449  Law Commission Issues Paper above n 3 at [5.32 to 5.33]. 
450  At 5.32. 
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This reality approach may appear to confuse ‘control’ with the discretions given to 
trustees.  However, equitable presumptions will not sit easily in a Family Court when it is 
apparent, on the evidence, that a spouse or partner is likely to make self-serving 
distributions and unlikely to be held to account.  It is also instructive to reflect on the 
events in Spry after the High Court of Australia determined the meaning of property.  As 
previously explained Dr Spry refused to comply with the judgment and he then removed 
approximately $A4.4 million in cash from his daughters’ trusts and threatened to burn the 
money and if necessary go to jail rather than pay his former wife the sums ordered by the 
court.  The daughters and Mrs Spry intervened and retrieved the cash.  As the Full Court 
of the Family Court of Australia said “It does not suggest someone who has much regard 
to ‘equitable orthodoxy’.”451  The original Family Court assessment, that Dr Spry had 
complete control and was capable of using his powers to distribute the trust’s assets in a 
way that suited his needs, was vindicated. 
 
In New Zealand, it is the writer’s view that the enquiry as to whether a party has ‘control’ 
over the trust will develop from a social reality perspective and in the ways discussed in 
Walker and R v R [Occupation Order] 452 which involves an assessment of the trust deed, 
whether a party has effective control of the trust, the trustee decisions made during the 
qualifying relationship together with the likely use of the trust’s assets.     
 
E Australian Meaning of Property – Is it Relevant in New Zealand? 
 
There appears to be a view that the Australian approach to both the meaning of property 
and the alter ego trust should not be followed because it sits in an entirely different 
statutory property regime.453 It is accepted that there are certain aspects of the alter ego 
line of authorities and the effectiveness of the trust which need to be approached with 
caution. 
 
However, the one area which is instructive is the interface between the meaning of 
property and the presumptive power afforded to trust orthodoxy that there cannot be 
property interests in discretionary trusts.  The Australian judicial response has been to 
give ‘trumping’ power to the family law claims that alter ego trusts create property 
interests. 
  
451  Stephens v Stephens and Anor (2009) 42 Fam LR 423 at [134] May, Boland and O’Ryan JJ. 
452  R v R [Occupation Order] above n 275 at [61]. 
453  “Equity and the Property (Relationships) Act 1976” above n 96 at [41.2.2]. 




The FLA always gave the courts the option of considering effective ‘control’ as a 
financial resource454 of one of the parties to the marriage.  In terms of the structure of the 
FLA there was no need to expand the meaning of property.  However, the inability to 
make orders affecting a party’s financial resources coupled with the injustice of an 
insufficient property pool led the courts to expand the meaning of property.  If the 
conventional view was to be given presumptive power then the judicial response should 
have been contained around the treatment of financial resources.  The courts may have 
adopted the United Kingdom approach that fashions orders to give ‘judicious 
encouragement’455 to trustees to make distributions to satisfy the court’s judgment.  
However the alter ego doctrine adopted a different pathway by expanding the meaning of 
property at the expense of traditional trust principles. 
 
It is for these reasons that Australian case authority is relevant to New Zealand and 
illustrates the way that an operative conception of property acknowledges that whilst 
property claims involve conflict and change it is the importance of the underlying social 
values that matter most. 
  
F Other Options?  
 
Another criticism of the ‘bundle of rights’ doctrine, in the occupation order line of cases, 
is that such orders are not necessary and more principled grounds could have been used to 
reach the same result.  For instance, where there are conflicts between trustees, as in the 
case of R v R [Occupation Order]456 the proper course of action is to apply to the High 
Court to remove and replace the trustees.457 However, even if summary judgment is 
available it is unlikely that replacement trustees could be found quickly and be willing 
and able to resolve a dispute regarding occupation of the family’s principal residence.  In 
the interim the family would be paralysed, the animosity likely to increase and 
consequently this is likely to be to the detriment of the children of the relationship and 
probably encourage parties to attempt ‘self-help’ remedies.  Commonly, at the time of 
separation, issues such as these need to be resolved promptly for the sake of all involved 
and the Family Court is in the best position to make the assessment as to who is to live in 
  
454  See discussion at Chapter 4 page. 
455  See discussion at Chapter 5 page. 
456  R v R above n 275. 
457  A Grant “The bundle of rights turns trusts to dust” NZ Lawyer (5 February 2010). 
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the home. From a policy perspective it is difficult to argue that these types of situations 
should be outside the jurisdiction of the court. 
 
Another criticism is that it was not necessary for the Family Court to consider the ‘bundle 
of rights’ doctrine on the facts of R v R because the trustees’ resolution granting the 
parties a right to occupy the home was likely to be property interest.458  However, the 
counter view was argued in Mv M459 that a resolution passed by a trustee does not create 
a legal or beneficial interest in the land as it is a bare licence to occupy and can be 
revoked at any time.  Whilst courts may be sympathetic to the idea that trusts should not 
preclude the courts from resolving disputes between parties in a qualifying relationship 
“the boundaries of the law have to be respected.460 These observations rest on the premise 
that until Parliament legislates to reform the Act it is not for the courts to create solutions. 
 
Whilst these lines of reasoning are valid in other statutory contexts they fail to recognise 
that the PRA is intended to be a code which displaces the rules and presumptions of the 
common law and equity to property transactions between spouses and partners.461  Once 
it is accepted that the property in question is the wealth that has been created during the 
parties’ qualifying relationship then the justifications for reliance on the trust orthodoxy 
fall away.   
 
G Other Policy Reasons 
 
Another reason that it is unreasonable to extend the meaning of property in family law is 
that it gives priorty to those in qualifying relationships over other discretionary 
beneficiaries.  In many modern discretionary trusts it is usual for the children of the 
relationship, or an earlier relationship together with other dependants to also be 
beneficiaries.  Giving priority to the position of the spouse or partner who is a ‘controller’ 
may result in a situation where the trust fund is exhausted to repay a debt based on the 
Walker ‘bundle of rights’ principles.  However, depending on the facts, other 
discretionary beneficiaries may always be in a position of having no more than a mere 
spes.  In Spry the High Court of Australia preferred the view that where the trust assets 
  
458  “Relationship Property and Trusts” above n 46 at p 13. 
459   M v M above n 290 at [42]. 
460  “Relationship Property and Trusts” above n 46 at p 23. 
461  Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 4(1)(a). 
104 Relationship Property and Trusts: The “Bundle of Rights” Theory  
 
 
represent wealth that has accumulated during the marriage then the children’s interests 
should be deferred. 
 
It is likely that this reasoning will apply in New Zealand because it is consistent with the 
approach taken by courts to applications for Orders settling property for the benefit of 
children of the relationship462 that they should be confined to limited circumstances.463  
The policy reason is that children will be best provided for by ensuring that the property 
division between the parties is implemented in accordance with the principles and 
purposes of the PRA. 
 
H Leave it to Parliament? 
 
In the space of this dissertation it is not possible to consider the wide body of literature 
which has been developed around judicial constraints in the making of judge law.  
Despite the court’s deference to Parliament it is widely accepted that Judges do make law 
in the decision making process.  The question this disseration asks is whether the ‘bundle 
of rights’ doctrine crosses the boundaries of the court’s decision making power with 
Parliament’s legislative prerogative. 
 
Arguably principles of trust law that have been developed over hundreds of years should 
be given priority over a conflicting meaning of property in family law.  Further, when the 
2001 reforms were enacted Parliament was aware of the problems that trusts created in 
relationship property claims but decided not to give the courts authority to access trust 
capital.  The “bundle of rights” theory does indirectly affect both the disposition and 
administration of trust assets.   
 
The doctrine of precedent provides the law with legitimacy and certainty but as Thomas 
observes:464 
 
But the precedent should be re-evaluated where it no longer appears to serve the 
interests of justice or is no longer adequate to meet the contemporary needs and 
expectations of the community.  The coercive element in the doctrine of precedent 
  
462  Property (Relationships) Act 1976 s 26. 
463  Fisher on Matrimonial and Relationship Property above n 100 at [18.83]. 
464  E W Thomas The Judicial Process: Realism, Pragmatism, Practical Reasoning and Principles  
(Cambridge University Press Cambridge, September 15 2005) at p 251. 
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would not longer prevail over the twin objectives of justice and relevance.  
Precedents would be like signposts pointing to the possilbe law or finding in the 
instant case, rather than rules directing the law or finding.  
 
Whether the development of the law, in the context of a particular case, rests with 
Parliament or the judiciary is of itself a prinicple of law to be determined by the courts.  
Where to draw the line depends upon whether the courts can appropriately shape the law 
more effectively than Parliament.  Thomas suggests that where the areas of the law have 
historically been the subject of case law such as contract, tort and trusts then they can be 
developed by a judge and should be “advanced to meet the community’s needs and 
expectations without the necessity of the occasional statutory boost.  Such areas of the 
law lend themselves to an incremental approach in accordance with legal principles.”465  
 
The development of the “bundle of rights’ theory is an incremental approach to expand 
the meaning of property in an area of the law which should not have to wait for a further 
statutory boost.   It is also a reflection of changes to the social, moral and economic fabric 
of New Zealand society.  The use of discretionary trusts in 2011 is vastly different to the 
trust principles that evolved over 200 years ago.  Even if the need for reform of the PRA 
has been a source of judical and academic comment, it does not mean that the courts 
should wait for Parliament to respond unless the suggested reform is before the 
legislature and that is not the situation here.   
 
Whilst the courts can take into consideration the current Law Commission’s review of the 
law of trusts it does not follow that courts should then show deference to the outcome of 
such a review as Thomas says “Regrettably, law reform reports may be found gathering 
dust and cobwebs in the basements of legislatures around the world.”:466  Finally, the 
courts should not ignore the consequences of a decision if it creates injustice because:467 
 
.. the courts should be slow to reject a sound submission requiring a development in 
the law because it is thought that the change should be left to Parliament.  Faced with 
the injustice or hardship, the court should think again.  … Judges cannot turn their 
back on the unfortunate consequences of their decision and, by leaving the law 
change to Parliament, assume that they have discharged themselves from 
responsibility for those consequences. 
 
  
465  At p 262. 
466  At p 262. 
467  At p 263. 
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In the context of family property law it is the writer’s view that it is within the decision-
making mandate of the court to adopt an expansive meaning of property.  The concept 
that effective ‘control’ of a discretionary trust creates a property interest in proceedings 
under the PRA does not mean it is applicable in general law.  Considerations of property 
interests in laws that govern the relationships of strangers are very different to those in 
marriage, civil union or de facto relationships.  Waiting for Parliament to reform the Act 
should not be a reason for the courts to give priority to orthodox trust principles. 
 





The ‘bundle of rights’ doctrine is a development of the law which has created property 
interests in the context of the PRA.  Although its application has been criticised because 
it offends orthodox trust principles much of the debate has lost sight of its stautory 
context.  The PRA is social legislation which creates different sets of rights and 
obligations for those in qualifying relationships from laws that deal with the property of 
strangers.  The Walker v Walker468case authority is an incremental development of the 
meaning of family property in the context of valuation cases and it is not an attempt to 
unravel trust law.  
 
For the reasons discussed in chapter 2, competing claims to property rights depend upon 
the importance of the underlying values associated with those rights.  The trust orthodoxy 
relies upon fiduciary obligations to regulate the trust relationship, to ensure that trustees 
exercise their discretions honestly and in good faith for the purposes of the trust.  Trusts 
which enable a spouse or partner to effectively control the trust undermine these codes of 
regulations. 
 
The claim that property rights are created when a party has control over a discretionary 
trust reflects the social reality that these types of trusts are an illusion of separate 
ownership in the context of family property law.  The core values reflected in the PRA 
are that the wealth generated during the qualifying relationship should be equally divided, 
that at the end of the relationship questions arising as to the division of property should 
be dealt with simply, speedily and inexpensively and the need to ensure that a just 
division takes into account the economic advantages and disadvantages to the parties at 
the end of the relationship. These values are more important in family law than the 
competing values of the trust orthodoxy.  
 
This dissertation does not suggest that the ‘bundle of rights’ doctrine can be applied in the 
general law.  Claims involving third party creditors or other claimants raise different core 
values and policy considerations.  The Court of Appeal in Wilson’s case was clear that 
the concept of the alter ego trust is not a separate cause of action in general trust cases.  
The possibility of an alter ego trust creating property interests under the PRA involves 
quite different considerations which prompted Glazebrook J469 to comment on its 
possible application in relationship property claims. 
  
468  Walker v Walker above n 225. 
469  Wilson’s case above n 389 at [128]–[129]. 




Whilst trust lawyers may express alarm and concern that the trust orthodoxy is being 
unravelled in a way that has no precedent in law it needs to be emphasised that it is not 
the traditional law of trust that has created these property interests.  Rather it is the 
development of the modern trust which gives effective control to a settlor or appointor 
that has attacked the purity of the trust coupled with legislation that recognises quite 
different rights and obligations for those in qualifying relationships.   
 
 The traditional trust which separates legal and beneficial ownership, places restraints on 
the ability of settlors or trustees to benefit from the income and capital of the trust and 
can be regulated by the laws of powers and fiduciary obligations are outside the ‘bundle 
of rights’ doctrine.  This may create a further sub-set of trust situations which remain 
outside the ambit of the PRA or s 182 Family Proceedings Act 1980.  These types of 
cases will need to await Parliamentary reform. 
 
There will also be situations where the “bundle of rights” doctrine will have to address 
situations where there is little property outside the trust.  For the reasons discussed in 
chapters 6 the PRA does not provide jurisdiction to the Family Court to access the trust’s 
capital but depending upon the facts the use of judicious encouragement may assist the 
reluctant spouse and his or her co-trustees to use their powers to distribute sufficient trust 
capital to satisfy relationship property claims.   
 
This is not to suggest that in time New Zealand Courts could not deliver a decision 
similar to the High Court of Australia’s approach in Kennon v Spry470 but in the 
meantime it is more likely that the law will develop in an incremental way.  For the 
reasons already discussed the PRA invokes a fluid concept of property and changing 
social values will continue to throw out challenges to the courts to consider conflicting 
claims that some rights or interests should be given a property status over others.  
 
Running parallel with the “bundle of rights” doctrine is the development of the law 
regarding the setting aside of dispositions to trusts.  For the reasons discussed in chapter 6 
the recent decisions of Regal Castings471 and Ryan and Unkovich472 have opened the 
door to the possibility that wealth generated during the relationship can be returned to the 
pool of relationship property.  The case law will become increasingly important when gift 
  
470  Kennon v Spry above n162. 
471  Regal Castings  above n 336. 
472  Ryan v Unkovich above n 338. 
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duty is abolished later this year because currently the “bundle of rights” doctrine rests on 
the valuation of debts owed by the trust to the parties.  If s44 is applied in a restricted way 
then the challenge will be to see if the courts are prepared to extend the “bundle of rights” 
doctrine outside the valuation of debts or in the occupation order cases.  
 
This an exciting and challenging time for both trust and family lawyers as they navigate 
through largely uncharted waters.  No doubt the debate will be heated.  Trust and family 
lawyers often develop their analytical skills in very different social environments.  Those 
that are steeped in the trust orthodoxy will struggle to understand how trusts can be 
exposed to claims by spouses or partners. Yet many have voiced concerns that a growing 
number of trusts are insincere and open to attack.  Family lawyers are often deeply 
suspicious of discretionary trusts as they perceive them to be a way to avoid obligations 
under the PRA and yet many family practitioners will readily see the benefits of trusts as 
they can shelter wealth that is not created by the relationship, such as inheritances.   
 
The picture is complex and the underlying principles deserve a rigorous debate.  The 
outcome will enrich our understanding of the meaning of property in family law, how 
property rights and interests evolve over time and why there can be different meanings of 
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